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Two Essays in Financial Engineering
Linan Yang
This dissertation consists of two essays in financial engineering: one on credit valuation
adjustment and the other on stock trading with realization utility.
In the first part of this dissertation, we investigate the potential impact of wrong-way
risk on calculating credit valuation adjustment (CVA) to a derivatives portfolio. A credit
valuation adjustment (CVA) is an adjustment applied to the value of a derivative contract
or a portfolio of derivatives to account for counterparty credit risk. Counterparty credit
risk measurement integrates two sources of risk: market risk, which determines the size of
a firm’s exposure to a counterparty, and credit risk, which reflects the likelihood that the
counterparty will default on its obligations. Measuring CVA requires combining models of
market and credit risk to estimate the counterparty’s risk of default together with the market
value of the firm’s exposure to the counterparty at default. Wrong-way risk refers to the
possibility that a counterparty’s likelihood of default increases with the market value of the
exposure.
We develop a method for bounding wrong-way risk, holding fixed marginal models for
market and credit risk and varying the dependence between them. Given simulated paths
of the two models, we solve a linear program to find the worst-case CVA resulting from
wrong-way risk. We analyze properties of the solution and prove convergence of the esti-
mated bound as the number of paths increases. The worst case can be overly pessimistic,
so we extend the procedure by constraining the deviation of the joint model of market and
credit risk from a reference model. Measuring the deviation through relative entropy leads to
a tractable convex optimization problem that can be solved through the iterative proportional
fitting procedure. By varying the penalty for deviations, we can sweep out the full range of
possible CVA values for different degrees of wrong-way risk. Here, too, we prove conver-
gence of the resulting estimate of the penalized worst-case CVA and the joint distribution
that attains it. We consider extensions with additional constraints and illustrate the method
with examples. Our method addresses an important source of model risk in counterparty risk
measurement.
In the second part, we study investors’ trading behavior in a model of realization utility.
We assume that investors’ trading decisions are driven not only by the utility of consump-
tion and terminal wealth, but also by the utility burst from realizing a gain or a loss. More
precisely, we consider a dynamic trading problem in which an investor decides when to pur-
chase and sell a stock to maximize her wealth utility and realization utility with her reference
points adapting to the stock’s gain and loss asymmetrically.
We study, both theoretically and numerically, the optimal trading strategies and asset
pricing implications of two types of agents: adaptive agents, who realize prospectively the
reference point adaptation in the future, and naive agents, who fail to do so. We find that
an adaptive agent sells the stock more frequently when the stock is at a gain than a naive
agent does, and that the adaptive agent asks for a higher risk premium for the stock than
the naive agent does in equilibrium. Moreover, compared to a non-adaptive agent whose
reference point does not change with the stock’s gain and loss, both the adaptive and naive
agents sell the stock less frequently, and the naive agent requires the same risk premium as
the non-adaptive agent does.
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This dissertation consists of two parts in which we utilize various methods in applied proba-
bility, optimization, and stochastic control to solve two problems in the areas of counterparty
credit risk and behavioral finance: credit valuation adjustment (CVA) with wrong-way risk
and stock trading with realization utility.
In Chapter 2, we focus on credit valuation adjustment and wrong-way risk. Research on
counterparty credit risk dated back to nineties, but it takes on heightened importance since
the financial crisis in 2008. Counterparty credit risk is taken on by an entity entering an over-
the-counter (OTC) contract with a counterparty which has a relevant default probability; if
the counterparty were to default, the expected value of all future net payments to this entity
turn into a loss for this entity. Counterparty credit risk is associated with all OTC transactions
with a defaultable counterparty, and all the agents taking OTC transactions need to take care
of counterparty credit risk regardless of the type of transactions.
Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) has become an important tool for managing counter-
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party credit risk. CVA measures the value of counterparty credit risk, and is contracted as a
credit derivative that can be traded and hedged, although most banks take it as a reserve and
do not manage it actively. With CVA, an agent doing OTC transactions can focus on their
major market risk and transfer counterparty credit risk to another agent, who is specialized
in trading CVA, by paying a CVA premium. The OTC transactions can be deemed as coun-
terparty risk free as the second agent would meet the payment obligation if the counterparty
were to default.
Although conceptually simple, calculating CVA of a typical portfolio is not an easy task.
It is similar as pricing a complex illiquid instrument, and needs to take into account three
factors. The first factor is the value of the underlying portfolio, which may consist of multiple
transactions across different markets with various counterparties. Portfolio valuation itself
can be complicated because multiple market factors and pricing models may be involved.
The second factor is the collateral rule, netting agreement, and recovery at default. The
first two factors together determine the exposure of the portfolio holder to its counterparties,
which may turn into a loss at counterparty’s default. The third factor is the credit quality of
the counterparty.
Furthermore, co-dependency generally exists between the portfolio exposure and coun-
terparty’s credit quality, which brings in further complexity in calculating CVA. The possibil-
ity that market risk and counterparty credit risk move together, so that the market exposure
increases just as the counterparty’s risk of default increases, is referred to as wrong-way
risk. Wrong-way risk arises, for example, if one bank sells credit default swap protection
on another bank with a similar profile. The value of the credit protection increases when the
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second bank faces financial difficulties; this is likely to be a scenario in which the bank that
sold the protection is also at greater risk of default. In practice, the sources and nature of
wrong-way risk are often less obvious.
In this dissertation we introduce a method for bounding wrong-way risk in CVA calcula-
tion — that is, for finding the largest CVA that is consistent with fixed models for market risk
of the portfolio and credit risk of the counterparty, letting the dependence between market
and credit risk vary. Our approach builds on a standard simulation framework for CVA calcu-
lation: paths of underlying market risk factors are simulated over time; a portfolio is revalued
(often using approximations) at fixed dates along each path of the market risk factors; the
counterparty’s time to default is either simulated from a credit risk model or extracted from
a credit curve. Given a set of paths of portfolio exposures and the distribution of the time to
default, we find the worst-case CVA by solving a linear programming problem. The linear
program finds the assignment of default times to paths that results in the largest possible
CVA, given the constraints on the default time distribution and the set of paths simulated
from the market model. As a byproduct, the dual variables associated with the constraints
on the marginal default time distribution provide sensitivities of the worst-case CVA to the
default probabilities.
A strength of this approach is that it yields the largest possible CVA value consistent with
given models for market and credit risk. Because it finds the worst-case wrong-way risk,
this approach can also be too conservative. We then extend the method by constraining the
deviation of the joint model of market and credit risk from a reference model, or equivalently
by penalizing deviations from a reference model and finding the resulting tempered CVA. A
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natural choice for the reference model is to take market and credit risk to be independent
of each other.1 By varying the penalty for deviations, we can sweep out the full range of
potential CVA values from the independent case to the worst-case wrong-way risk. The
penalized problem can no longer be solved through linear programming, but we formulate
it as a tractable convex optimization problem. The special structure of this problem leads to
a convenient solution through iterative rescaling of the rows and columns of a matrix. Dual
variable are obtained through the iterative rescaling process, providing sensitivity result for
the tempered CVA to the default probability.
The result obtained from above optimization method is an estimator of CVA based on
simulation outcomes of the market factors and empirical default distribution of the counter-
party. We then establish the consistency of this estimator for both worst-case and tempered
CVA. In other words, we show that as the sample size of market paths increases, the esti-
mated CVA converges to its true value. At last, we extend the model to include the martingale
property of the market risk factors by adding additional equality constraints. We also show
that this model can be easily extended to bilateral CVA in which the agent’s self-default is
also considered in CVA calculation.
To summarize, our model provides a very general framework for CVA calculation to ac-
count for the impact of wrong-way risk. It applies to both single transactions and portfolios.
In addition, it is computationally efficient, because it reuses simulated exposure paths that
need to be generated anyway to estimate CVA even ignoring wrong-way risk.
In Chapter 3, we study investors’ trading behavior in a model of realization utility. In
1The Basel III standardized approach for CVA assumes independence and then multiplies the resulting CVA
by a factor of 1.4.
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neoclassical finance, investors are assumed to maximize the utility of their consumption and
wealth. Economic models in this regard, however, cannot explain many empirical findings;
see for instance Barberis and Thaler [5] and Campbell [20]. For example, Shefrin and Stat-
man [51] find that individual investors are reluctant to sell stocks trading at a loss relative to
the price at which they were purchased, a phenomenon called disposition effect, for which
models in neoclassical finance fail to provide a satisfactory explanation. Recently, Barberis
and Xiong [6] propose a model of realization utility to explain the disposition effect.
Barberis and Xiong [6] assume that investors experience utility directly from realizing
a gain or a loss on the sale of the risky assets (e.g., stocks) they hold. As defined by Bar-
beris and Xiong [6], realization utility is a consequence of two cognitive processes: First,
instead of viewing their investment history in terms of the investment return, investors of-
ten think about it as a series of investment episodes. Second, an investor feels good, i.e.,
receives positive realization utility, when she sells a stock at a gain because she is creating a
positive investment episode; on the other hand, she feels bad, i.e., experiences negative real-
ization utility, when she sells the stock at a loss because she is creating a negative investment
episode. Barberis and Xiong [6] employs cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahne-
man [40, 53]) with a piece-wise linear utility function to measure the realization utility of a
gain or a loss. Ingersoll and Jin [38] extends Barberis and Xiong [6] by using an S-shaped
utility function.
In this dissertation, we extend the works by Barberis and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll and
Jin [38] in two aspects. First, in addition to realization utility, the agent in our model also
experiences utility from her terminal wealth. As in neoclassical finance, we use the classical
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expected utility theory to model the terminal wealth utility. Second, the reference point of
the agent, which decides whether the agent is experiencing a gain or a loss at the current
stock price, is assumed to be the purchase price at the time of purchase and then adapt to the
stock’s gain and loss, and the adaptation to the gain is more than to the loss. Instead, Barberis
and Xiong [6] assume the reference point to be the purchase price growing at the risk-free
rate, and Ingersoll and Jin [38] assume the reference point to be fixed at the purchase price.
Experimental evidence in Baucells et al. [9] and Arkes et al. [1, 2] reveals that when selling
a stock, most investors choose their reference points to be the purchase price plus a portion
of the prior paper gain and loss of the stock. Moreover, the reference point adapts more to
a prior gain than to a comparable prior loss. Therefore, our model is more consistent with
individuals’ behavior observed in the literature.
More precisely, we consider a dynamic trading problem in which an agent decides when
to purchase and sell a stock to maximize her realization utility with her reference point
adapting to the stock’s gain and loss asymmetrically. We formulate the trading problem
as an optimal stopping problem and solve it completely. We study, both theoretically and
numerically, the optimal trading strategies and asset pricing implications of two types of
agents: adaptive agents who realize prospectively the reference point adaptation in the future,
and naive agents who fail to do so. We have three main findings: First, when becoming more
concerned with the terminal wealth utility, both the naive and adaptive agents sell the stock
less frequently and ask for a higher risk premium for the stock in equilibrium. Second, an
adaptive agent sells the stock more (less) frequently when the stock is at a gain (at a loss)
than a naive agent does, and the adaptive agent asks for a higher risk premium for the stock
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than the naive agent does in equilibrium. Third, compared to a non-adaptive agent whose
reference point does not adapt to the stock’s gain and loss, both the adaptive and naive agents
sell the stock less frequently, and the naive agent requires the same risk premium as the non-
adaptive agent does.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are self-contained and independent of each other.
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Chapter 2
Credit Valuation Adjustment and
Wrong-Way Risk
2.1 Introduction
When a firm enters into a swap contract, it is exposed to market risk through changes in
market prices and rates that affect the contract’s cash flows. It is also exposed to the risk that
the party on the other side of the contract may default and fail to make payments due on the
transaction. Thus, market risk determines the magnitude of one party’s exposure to another,
and credit risk determines the likelihood that this exposure will become a loss. Derivatives
counterparty risk refers to this combination of market and credit risk, and proper measure-
ment of counterparty risk requires integrating market uncertainty and credit uncertainty.
The standard tool for quantifying counterparty risk is the credit valuation adjustment,
CVA, which can be thought of as the price of counterparty risk. Suppose firm A has entered
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into a set of derivative contracts with firm B. From the perspective of firm A, the CVA for
this portfolio of derivatives is the difference between the value the portfolio would have if
firm B were default-free and the actual value taking into account the credit quality of firm B.
More precisely, this is a unilateral CVA; a bilateral CVA adjusts for the credit quality of both
firms A and B.
Counterparty risk generally and CVA in particular have taken on heightened importance
since the failures of major derivatives dealers Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG Fi-
nancial Products in 2008. A new CVA-based capital charge for counterparty risk is among
the largest changes to capital requirements under Basel III for banks with significant deriva-
tives activity (BCBS [8]). CVA calculations are significant consumers of bank computing re-
sources, typically requiring simulation of all relevant market variables (prices, interest rates,
exchanges rates), valuing every derivative at every time step on every path, and integrating
these market exposures with a model of credit risk for each counterparty. See Canabarro and
Duffie [21] and Gregory [34] for background on industry practice.
Our focus in this chapter is on the effect of dependence between market and credit risk.
Wrong-way risk refers to the possibility that a counterparty will become more likely to de-
fault when the market exposure is larger and the impact of the default is greater; in other
words, it refers to positive dependence between market and credit risk. Wrong-way risk
arises, for example, if one bank sells put options on the stock of another similar bank. The
value of the options increases as the price of the other bank’s stock falls; this is likely to be
a scenario in which the bank that sold the options is also facing financial difficulty and is
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less likely to be able to make payment on the options. In practice, the sources and nature of
wrong-way risk may be less obvious.
Holding fixed the marginal features of market risk and credit risk, greater positive de-
pendence yields a larger CVA. But capturing dependence between market and credit risk is
difficult. There is often ample data available for the separate calibration of market and credit
models but little if any data for joint calibration. CVA is calculated under a risk-adjusted
probability measure, so historical data is not directly applicable. In addition, for their CVA
calculations banks often draw on many valuation models developed for trading and hedging
specific types of instruments that cannot be easily integrated with a model of counterparty
credit risk. CVA computation is much easier if dependence is ignored. Indeed, the Basel III
standardized approach for CVA assumes independence and then multiplies the result by a
factor of 1.4; this ad hoc factor is intended to correct for several sources of error, including
the lack of dependence information.
Models that explicitly describe dependence between market and credit risk include in
CVA calculation include Brigo, Capponi, and Pallavicini [17], Crépey [25], Hull and White
[37], and Rosen and Saunders [46]; see Brigo, Morini, and Pallavicini [18] for an extensive
overview of modeling approaches. Dependence is usually introduced by correlating default
intensities with market risk factors or through a copula. A direct model of dependence is,
in principle, the best approach to CVA. However, correlation-based models generally pro-
duce weak dependence between market and credit risk, and both techniques are difficult to
calibrate.
In this chapter, we develop a method to bound the effect of dependence, holding fixed
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marginal models of market and credit risk. Our approach uses simulated paths that would be
needed anyway for a CVA calculation without dependence. Given paths of market exposures
and information (simulated or implied from prices) about the distribution of time to the
counterparty’s default, we show that finding the worst-case CVA is a linear programming
problem. The linear program is easy to solve, and it provides a bound on the potential
impact of wrong-way risk. We view this in-sample bound based on a finite set of paths
as an estimate of the worst-case CVA for a limiting problem and prove convergence of the
estimator. The limiting problem is an optimization over probability measures with given
marginals. We also show that the LP formulation has additional useful features. It extends
naturally to a bilateral CVA calculation, and it allows additional constraints. Moreover, the
dual variables associated with constraints on the marginal default time distribution provide
useful information for hedging purposes.
The strength of the LP solution is that it yields the largest possible CVA value — the
worst possible wrong-way risk — consistent with marginal information about market and
credit risk. This is also a shortcoming, as the worst case can be too pessimistic. We therefore
extend the method by constraining or penalizing deviations from a nominal reference model.
The reference model could be one in which marginals are independent or linked through
some simple model of dependence. A large penalty produces a CVA value close to that
obtained under the reference model, and with no penalty we recover the LP solution. Varying
the penalty parameter allows us to “interpolate” between the reference model and the worst-
case joint distribution.
To penalize deviations from the reference model, we use a relative entropy measure be-
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tween probability distributions, also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Once we
add the penalty, finding the worst-case joint distribution is no longer a linear programming
problem, but it is still convex. Moreover, the problem has a special structure that allows
convenient solution through iterative rescaling of the rows and columns of a matrix. This
iterative rescaling projects a starting matrix onto the convex set of joint distributions with
given marginals. Here, too, we prove convergence of the in-sample solution to the solution
of a limiting problem as the number of paths increases.
The problem of finding extremal joint distributions with given marginals has a long and
rich history. It includes the well-known Fréchet bounds in the scalar case and the mul-
tivariate generalization of Brenier [16] and Rüschendorf and Rachev [49]; see the books
by Rüschendorf [48] and Villani [54] for detailed treatments and historical remarks. In fi-
nance, related ideas have been used to find robust or model-free bounds on option prices;
see Cox [23] for a survey. In some versions of the robust pricing problem, one observes
prices of simple European options and seeks to bound prices of path-dependent or multi-
asset options given the European prices, as in Carr, Ellis, and Gupta [22], Brown, Hobson,
and Rogers [19], and Tankov [52], among many others. This has motivated the study of mar-
tingale optimal transport problems in Dolinsky and Soner [29], Beiglböck and Juillet [10],
Henry-Labordère and Touzi [36]. The literature on price bounds focuses on extremal solu-
tions and does constrain or penalize deviations from a reference model.
Our focus is not on pricing but rather risk measurement. Within the risk measurement
literature, questions of joint distributions with given marginals arise in risk aggregation; see,
for example, Bernard, Jiang, and Wang [12], Embrechts and Puccetti [31], and Embrechts,
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Wang, and Wang [32]. A central problem in risk aggregations is finding the worst-case
distribution for a sum of random variables, given marginals for the summands.
Our work differs from earlier work in several respects. We focus on CVA, rather than
option pricing or risk aggregation. Our marginals may be quite complex and need not be
explicitly available — they are implicitly defined through marginal models for market and
credit risk. Given the generality of the setting, we do not seek to characterize extremal
joint distributions but rather to estimate bounds using samples generated from the marginals.
We temper the bounds by constraining deviations from a reference model, drawing on the
idea of robustness as developed in economics in Hansen and Sargent [35] and distributional
robustness as developed in the optimization literature in Ben-Tal et al. [11] and references
there. The methods we develop are easy to implement in practice. The main contribution lies
in the formulation and in the convergence analysis. Our general approach to convergence is
to use primal and dual optimization problems to get upper and lower bounds.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Chapter 2.2, we introduce the problem
setting, and in Chapter 2.3 we introduce the optimization formulation for the worst case CVA
bound and show convergence of the bound estimator. In Chapter 2.4, we extend the problem
to a robust formulation with a relative entropy constraint, and we provide numerical exam-




To help fix ideas, we start with an example. Consider a T -year foreign exchange forward
contract between a U.S. bank, which receives U.S. dollar payments, and a foreign bank which
receives its local currency. The contract has forward exchange rate K and notional size S. If
the foreign currency weakens against the dollar, the foreign bank’s credit quality is likely to
deteriorate with its currency, just as the U.S. bank’s exposure increases, so this transaction
exhibits evident wrong-way risk.
Let Ut be the exchange rate, measured as the number of units of the foreign currency paid
in exchange for one U.S. dollar at time t. Assume this exchange rate follows an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process,
dUt = κ(Ū − Ut)dt+ σdWt,
where Ū is the level toward which the exchange rate mean-reverts, and Wt is a standard
Brownian motion.
CVA measures the discounted expected loss of a portfolio at the counterparty’s default, so
its calculation involves the default time of the counterparty and the discounted exposure value
of the portfolio of derivatives with this counterparty at the time of its default. Let τ denote
counterparty’s default time, and let V (τ) denote the discounted portfolio exposure at the
time of counterparty’s default. We assume that V (τ) accounts for all netting and collateral
agreements, as well as recovery. The portfolio exposure could be positive or negative, but
only the positive part leads to a loss at default, so the loss at default is denoted as V +(τ).
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The CVA for a time horizon T is the expected exposure at default,
CVA = E[V +(τ)1{τ ≤ T}], (2.2.1)
given a joint law for the default time τ and the exposure V +. Our focus will be on uncertainty
around this joint law, but we first provide some additional details on the problem formulation.
CVA is customarily calculated over a finite set of dates 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < td = T <
td+1 = ∞; for example, the dates can be monthly or quarterly, or the payment dates of the
underlying contracts. We limit τ to values in {t1, . . . , td, td+1} and let qj , j = 1, . . . , d + 1,
denote the probability that default occurs at tk, or, more precisely that it occurs in the interval
(tk−1, tk]. The distribution of the counterparty’s default time τ may be extracted from credit
default swap spreads, or it may be the result of a more extensive credit risk model — for
example, a stochastic intensity model.
An underlying simulation of market risk factors generates paths of all relevant market
variables and is used to generate exposure paths (V +(t1), . . . , V +(tK)). In our foreign ex-
change example,
V (tj) = e
−δtj(1−R) · E[e−δ(T−tj)S(UT −K)/UT |Utj ]
where δ is the discount rate and R is the recovery rate. The expectation gives the expected
exposure of the contract at time tj , and this value is discounted to t0 and adjusted for partial
recovery. The market risk model (in this example the exchange rate dynamics) implicitly
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determines the law of the positive exposure path (V +(t1), . . . , V +(td)), and we denote this
law by a probability measure p on Rd.
Calculating these exposures is a demanding task because it requires valuing all instru-
ments in a portfolio with a counterparty in each market scenario at each date. In addition,
the calculation of each V (tj) needs to account for netting and collateral agreements with the
counterparty and recovery rates if the counterparty were to default. The method we develop
takes these calculations as inputs and assumes the availability of independent copies of the
exposure paths.
LetX denote this vector of positive exposures at the specified dates, and let Y be a vector
of default indicators,
X = (V +(t1), . . . , V
+(td)) and Y = (1{τ = t1}, . . . ,1{τ = td}).
The problem of calculating CVA would reduce to the problem of calculating the expectation
of the inner product
< X, Y >=
d∑
j=1
V +(tj)1{τ = tj} = V +(τ)1{τ ≤ T},
if the joint law for X and Y were known.
However the joint law is in general unavailable and difficult to find because of limited
data on the dependence between market and credit risk. With the marginals fixed, we need to
assign a joint probability between X and Y to calculate CVA. As an upper bound, we seek
17





< x, y > dµ(x, y), (2.2.2)
where Π(p, q) denotes the set of probability measures on Rd × Rd with marginals p and q.
The characterization of extremal joint distributions with given marginals has a rich his-
tory; see Villani [54] and Rüschendorf [48] for recent treatments with extensive historical
remarks. In the scalar case d = 1, the largest value of (2.2.2) is attained by the comonotonic
construction, which sets X = F−1p (U) and Y = F
−1
q (U), where Fp and Fq are the cumula-
tive distribution functions associated with p and q, and U is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
The smallest value of (2.2.2) is attained by setting Y = F−1q (1 − U) instead. In the vector
case, a characterization of joint laws maximizing (2.2.2) has been given by Brenier [16] and
Rüschendorf and Rachev [49]. It states that under an optimal coupling, Y is a subgradient of
a convex function of X , but this provides more of a theoretical description than a practical
characterization. Our setting has the added complication that at least p (and possibly also q)
is itself unknown and only implicitly specified through a simulation model.
2.3 Worst-Case CVA
2.3.1 Estimation
We develop a simulation procedure to estimate (2.2.2). As we noted earlier, generating expo-
sure paths is the most demanding part of a CVA calculation. Our approach essentially reuses
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these paths to bound the potential effect of wrong-way risk at little additional computational
cost.
Let X1, . . . , XN be N independent copies of X , and let Y1, . . . , YN be N independent











1{Yi ∈ ·}, (2.3.1)
For notational simplicity, we will assume that p has no atoms so that, almost surely, there are
no repeated values in X1, X2, . . . . This allows us to identify the empirical measure pN on Rd
with the uniform distribution on the set {X1, . . . , XN} or on the set of indices {1, . . . , N}.
The assumption that p has no atoms is without loss of generality because we can expand the
dimension of X to include an independent, continuously distributed coordinate Xd+1 and
expand Y by setting Yd+1 ≡ 0 without changing (2.2.2).
Observe that Y is supported on the finite set {y1, . . . , yd+1}, with y1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , yd =
(0, 0, . . . , 1), and yd+1 = (0, . . . , 0). Each yj has probability q(yj). These probabilities may
be known or estimated from simulation of N independent copies Y1, . . . , YN of Y , in which
case we denote the empirical frequency of each yj by qN(yj).
We will put a joint mass function PNij on the set of pairs {(Xi, yj), i = 1, . . . , N ,
j = 1, . . . , d + 1}. We restrict attention to the set Π(pN , qN) of joint mass functions with







PNij < Xi, yj > .
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Pij = 1/N, i = 1, ..., N, (2.3.3)
N∑
i=1
Pij = qN(yj), j = 1, ..., d+ 1 and (2.3.4)
Pij ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., d+ 1, (2.3.5)
with Cij =< Xi, yj >. Constraint (2.3.3) ensures that the paths X1, . . . , XN of market
factors get equal weight; constraint (2.3.4) ensures that the default-time distribution in the
joint model has the correct marginal distribution. In our running example, we have
Cij = (V
i(tj))
+ = e−δtj(1−R) · E+[e−δ(T−tj)S(UT −K)/UT |U itj ].
In particular, this has the structure of a transportation problem, for which efficient algorithms
are available, for example a strongly polynomial algorithm; see Kleinschmidt and Schannath
[41]. Bilateral CVA, involving the joint distribution of market exposure and the default times
of both parties, admits a similar formulation.
To better understand the optimal solution joint probability, we can make the following
assumptions: without loss of generality, N is large enough and default time probabilities qj ,
for all j, are properly rounded to be multiple of 1/N . If we let i be row index and j be
column index, there is an optimal solution matrix P ∗ to the above linear program, which,
with proper order of rows, is a block diagonal matrix with nonzero values on the diagonal
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and zeros off the diagonal. This means that default probability is very concentrated for each
market scenario, and each exposure path gets assigned only one possible default time.
2.3.2 Sensitivity
To formulate the dual problem, let ai and bj be dual variables associated with constraints









subject to ai + bj ≥ Cij, i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., d.
The dual variables are useful because they measure the sensitivity of the estimated worst-
case CVA to the marginal constraints. Consider any vector of perturbations (∆q1, . . . ,∆qd+1)
to the mass function qN with components that sum to zero. Suppose these perturbations are





In particular, we can calculate the sensitivity of the worst-case CVA to a parallel shift in the
credit curve by setting ∆qj = ∆, j = 1, . . . , d, and ∆qd+1 = −d∆, for sufficiently small ∆.
2.3.3 Convergence as N →∞
The solution to the linear program provides an estimate ĈVA∗ based on N simulated paths.
But we are ultimately interested in CVA∗ in (2.2.2), the worst-case CVA based on the true
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marginal laws for market and credit risk, rather than their sample counterparts. We show that
our estimate converges to CVA∗ almost surely as N increases.
Although in our application Y has finite support, we state the following result more
generally. For probability laws p and q on Rd, let pN and qN denote the corresponding
empirical laws in (2.3.1). Let Π(p, q), Π(pN , qN), and Π(pN , q) denote the sets of probability
measures on Rd × Rd with the indicated arguments as marginals.

























< x, y > µ(dx, dy).
The proof follows from results on optimal transport in Villani [54]; see Appendix A.1.
2.4 Robust Formulation with a Relative Entropy Constraint
The linear program (2.3.2)–(2.3.5) provides a simple way to bound the impact of wrong-way
risk and estimate a worst-case CVA, and Theorem 2.3.1 establishes the consistency of this
estimate as the number of paths grows. An attractive feature of this approach is that it reuses
simulated exposure paths that need to be generated anyway to estimate CVA even ignoring
wrong-way risk.
A drawback of the bound CVA∗ is that it may be too pessimistic: the worst-case joint
distribution may be implausible, even if it is theoretically feasible. To address this concern,
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we extend our analysis and formulate the problem of bounding wrong-way risk as a question
of robustness to model uncertainty. By controlling the degree of uncertainty we can temper
the bound on wrong-way risk.
2.4.1 Constrained and Penalized Problems
In this formulation, we start with a reference model for the dependence between the market
and credit models and control model uncertainty by constraining deviations from the refer-
ence model. To be concrete, we will assume that the reference model takes market and credit
risk to be independent, though this is not essential. We use ν to denote the corresponding
element of Π(p, q) that makes X and Y independent; in other words,
ν(A×B) = p(A)q(B),





< x, y > dν(x, y) =
∫
Rd×Rd
< x, y > dp(x)dq(y).
To constrain deviations from the reference model, we need a notion of “distance” be-
tween probability measures. Among the many candidates, relative entropy, also known as
the Kullback-Leibler divergence, is particularly convenient. For probability measures P and
F on a common measurable space and with F >> P , the relative entropy of P to F is
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defined as

















the subscripts indicating the measure with respect to which the expectation is taken. Relative
entropy is frequently used to quantify model uncertainty; see, for example, Hansen and Sar-
gent [35] and Ben-Tal et al. [11]. Relative entropy is not symmetric in its arguments, but this
is not necessarily a drawback because we think of the reference model as a favored bench-
mark. We are interested in the potential impact of deviations from the reference model, but
we do not necessarily view nearby alternative models as equally plausible. Relative entropy
D(P |F ) is convex in P , and this will be important for our application. Also, D(P |F ) = 0
only if P = F .
To find a tempered worst case for wrong-way risk, we maximize CVA with the marginal
models p and q held fixed and with a constraint η > 0 on the relative entropy divergence











)dµ ≤ η. (2.4.2)
At η = 0, the only feasible solution is the reference model µ = ν. At η = ∞, the problem
reduces to the worst-case CVA of the previous section. Varying the relative entropy budget
η thus controls the degree of confidence in the reference model or the degree of wrong-way
risk.
We are actually interested in solving this problem for a range of η values to see how
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the potential impact of wrong-way risk varies with the degree of model uncertainty. For
this purpose, it will be convenient to work with a penalty on relative entropy rather than a












The penalty term subtracted from the linear objective is nonnegative because relative
entropy is nonnegative. At θ = 0, the penalty would be infinite unless µ = ν; at θ =
∞, the penalty drops out and we recover the worst-case linear program of Section 2.3. A
related problem appears in Bosc and Galichon [15], but without a reference model ν. The
correspondence between the constrained problem (2.4.1)–(2.4.2) and the penalized problem
(2.4.3) is established in the following result, proved in the Appendix A.2:








The mapping from θ to η(θ) is increasing, and η(θ) ∈ (0, η∗] for θ ∈ (0,∞), where η∗ is
(2.4.4) evaluated at the solution to (2.2.2).
In the following, we write CVAθ instead of CVAη(θ) for θ ∈ (0,∞). To estimate CVAθ,
we form a sample counterpart, modifying the linear programming formulation (2.3.2)–(2.3.5).
We denote the finite sample reference joint probabilities by Fij . In the independent case,
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these are given by Fij = qN(yj)/N , i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , d + 1. Let P θ denote the


















subject to (2.3.3)-(2.3.5). (2.4.5)









In the penalty formulation (2.4.3), if we let θ < 0 and replace sup by inf, we get CVA
with right-way risk, in which case the likelihood of default of the counterparty decreases
with the market value of exposure.
2.4.2 Iterative Proportional Fitting Procedure
The penalty problem (2.4.5) is a convex optimization problem and can be solved using gen-
eral optimization methods. However, the choice of relative entropy for the penalty leads to
a particularly simple and interesting method through the iterative proportional fitting pro-
cedure (IPFP). The method dates to Deming and Stephan [28], yet it continues to generate
extensions and applications in many areas.









As before, Fij is the independent joint distribution with prescribed marginals pN and qN ,
which we take as reference model. Each Cij =< Xi, yj > is the loss on market risk path i
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if the counterparty defaults at time tj . With θ > 0, the numerator of M θij puts more weight
on combinations that produce larger losses. In this sense, M θij is designed to emphasize
wrong-way risk.
The denominator of M θij normalizes the entries to sum to 1, but M
θ will not in general
have the target marginals. The IPFP algorithm projects a matrixM with positive entries onto
the set of joint distribution matrices with marginals pN and qN by iteratively renormalizing
the rows and columns as follows:
(r) For i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , d+ 1, set Mij ←MijpN(i)/
∑d+1
k=1Mik.
(c) For j = 1, . . . , d+ 1 and i = 1, . . . , N , set Mij ←MijqN(j)/
∑N
n=1 Mnj .
This iteration is also known as biproportional scaling, Sinkhorn’s algorithm, and the RAS
algorithm; see Pukelsheim [45] for an overview of the extensive literature on the theory and
application of these methods.
Write Φ(M) for the result of applying both steps (r) and (c) to M , and write Φ(n) for the
n-fold composition of Φ. For our setting, we need the following result:
Proposition 2.4.2. The sequence Φ(n)(M θ), n ≥ 1, converges to the solution P θ to (2.4.5).













In other words, the IPFP algorithm converges to the feasible matrix (in the sense of (2.3.3)-
(2.3.5)) that is closest to the initial matrix in the sense of relative entropy. For our particular
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)−WNθ subject to (2.3.3)-(2.3.5),







. This follows directly from the definition of M θ.
Because WNθ does not depend on P , this maximization problem has the same solution as
(2.4.5). 
With θ < 0, the limit of IPFP algorithm solves the penalty problem (2.4.5) with max
replaced by min, corresponding to right-way risk in the sense that it minimizes the CVA
subject to the marginal constraints and the penalty on deviations from the reference model.
To summarize, we start with the reference model Fij , put more weight on adverse out-
comes to get M θij , and then iteratively renormalize the rows and columns of M
θ to match
the target marginals. This procedure converges to the penalized worst-case joint distribution
defined by (2.4.5) with penalty parameter θ.
2.4.3 Sensitivity Through Dual Variables

















Let (a∗, b∗) denote the optimal dual solution, and consider a vector of small perturbations
(∆q1, . . . ,∆qd+1) to the marginal distribution qN with components that sum to zero. For
perturbations small enough to keep the dual solution unchanged, we can estimate the change
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We can calculate the sensitivity to a parallel shift in the credit curve by setting ∆qj = ∆,
j = 1, . . . , d, and ∆qd+1 = −d∆, for sufficiently small ∆.
The dual solution can be obtained as a byproduct of the IPFP algorithm. The optimal
primal solution takes the form P θij = Fije
θ(Cij−a∗i−b∗j ), where a∗ and b∗ are optimal dual










θ·Cij is the normalization term in Mij .
Let ri(n) be the i-th row sum of Φ(n)(M) and let cj(n) be the j-th column sum of





























2.4.4 Convergence as N →∞
We now formulate a convergence result as the number of paths N increases. As before, let
Π(p, q) denote the set of probability measures on Rd×Rd with marginals p and q. Let pN , qN
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denote the empirical measures in (2.3.1), and let Π(pN , qN) denote the set of joint laws with
these marginals. The independent joint distributions are ν ∈ Π(p, q) and νN ∈ Π(pN , qN);
i.e., dν(x, y) = dp(x)dq(y) and dνN(x, y) = dpN(x)dqN(y).
Fix θ > 0 and define, for a probability measure µ on Rd × Rd,
G(µ, ν) =
∫
< x, y > dµ− 1
θ
D(µ|ν),
and define G(µ, νN) accordingly. To show that our simulation estimate of the penalized
worst-case CVA converges to the true value, we need to show that
∫
< x, y > dµ∗N →
∫
< x, y > dµ∗, a.s. (2.4.7)
where µ∗N ∈ Π(pN , qN) maximizes G(·, νN) and µ∗ ∈ Π(p, q) maximizes G(·, ν).
Theorem 2.4.1. Suppose the random vectors X and Y satisfy Eν [eθ<X,Y >] <∞ and that Y
has finite support. The following hold as N →∞.
1. max
µ∈Π(pN ,qN )
G(µ, νN) −→ sup
µ∈Π(p,q)
G(µ, ν), a.s.
2. The maximizer µ∗N ∈ Π(pN , qN) of G(·, νN) converges weakly to a maximizer µ∗ ∈
Π(p, q) of G(·, ν).
3. The penalized worst-case CVA converges to the true value, a.s.; i.e., (2.4.7) holds.
The proof is in Appendix A.3.
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2.5 Examples
2.5.1 A Gaussian Example
For purposes of illustration we begin with a simple example in whichX and Y are scalars and
normally distributed. This example is not intended to fit the CVA application but to illustrate
some features of the penalty formulation. It also lends itself to a simple comparison with a
Gaussian copula, which is another way of introducing dependence with given marginals.
Suppose then that X and Y have the standard normal distribution on R. Paralleling the
definition of the matrix M θ, consider the bivariate density







where c′ and c are normalization constants. This density weights the independent joint den-
sity at (x, y) by exp(θxy), so the product xy plays the role that Cij plays in the definition of
M θ.
The reweighting changes the marginals, so now we want to use a continuous version
of the IPFP algorithm to project f0 onto the set of bivariate densities with standard normal
marginals. The generalization of the algorithm from matrices to measures has been analyzed
in Rüschendorf [47]. The row and column operations become





fn+1(x, y)← f̂n(x, y)q(y)
/∫
f̂n(x, y) dx .
An induction argument shows that























1 + 4θ2, as n→∞.
Some further algebraic simplification then shows that the limit is a bivariate normal density










This is the bivariate distribution with standard normal marginals that maximizes the expec-
tation of XY with a penalty parameter of θ on the deviation from independence as measured
by relative entropy.
Observe that ρ = 0 when θ = 0; ρ → 1 as θ → ∞; and ρ → −1 as θ → −∞.
Because θ penalizes deviations from independence, it controls the strength of the dependence
between X and Y . The relationship between ρ and θ allows us to reinterpret the strength of
dependence as measured by θ in terms of the correlation parameter ρ. This is somewhat
analogous to the role of a correlation parameter in the Gaussian copula, where it measures
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the strength of dependence but is not literally the correlation between the marginals except
when the marginals are normal.
The fact that the IPFP algorithm projects f0 to a bivariate normal is a specific feature of
the weight exp(θxy) in (2.5.1). For contrast, we consider the weight exp(θx2y). The result-
ing f0 is no longer integrable for θ > 0, so we work instead with truncated and discretized
marginal distributions and apply the IPFP numerically. The result is shown in Figure 2.1.
The resulting density has nearly standard normal marginals (up to truncation and discretiza-
tion), but the joint distribution is clearly not bivariate normal.































Figure 2.1: Probability mass of joint truncated and discretized normal random variables X
and Y , with θ = 1 and initial weight exp(θx2y).
The dependence illustrated in the figure is beyond the scope of the Gaussian copula be-
cause any joint distribution with Gaussian marginals and a Gaussian copula must be Gaus-
sian. This example thus illustrates the broader point that our approach generates a wider
range of dependence than can be achieved with a specific type of copula. For examples of
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wrong-way risk CVA models based on the Gaussian copula, see Brigo et al. [18], Hull and
White [37], and Rosen and Saunders [46].
2.5.2 The Currency Swap Example
In this section, we apply the method on the example in Section 2.2. We take T = 10 years,
divide time into 20 time steps, and simulate 1000 market scenarios. Expected exposures are
adjusted for recoveries and discounted. The sample average positive expected exposure is
shown in Figure 2.2. For illustrative purpose, we assume that the counterparty’s default time
has an exponential distribution with hazard rate λ = 0.04. We use the following parameters:
(Ut0 , Ū ,K, κ, σ, λ, δ, S) = (1000, 1000, 1000, 0.3, 50, 0.04, 0.03, 10
6).












Figure 2.2: Sample Average Positive Exposure
Figure 2.3 shows a CVA stress test for wrong-way risk. It plots CVA against the penalty
parameter θ. The numbers are normalized by dividing by the independent market-credit risk
CVA, so the independent case θ = 0 is presented as 100%. As θ increases, the positive
dependence between market and credit risk increases, approaching the worst-case bound,
which is over six times as large as the independent CVA. For θ < 0, we have right-way risk,
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and the CVA bound approaches zero as θ decreases. The parameter θ could be rescaled using
the transformation in (2.5.2) to allow a rough interpretation as a correlation parameter.










Figure 2.3: CVA Stress Test
The Gaussian copula provides a simple alternative way to vary dependence and measure
wrong-way risk; see Rosen and Saunders [46] for details and applications. Figure 2.4 shows
how wrong-way risk varies in the Gaussian copula model as the correlation parameter ρ
varies from −1 to 1. Comparison with Figure 2.3 shows that constraining dependence to
conform to a Gaussian copula significantly underestimates the potential wrong-way risk.











Figure 2.4: CVA Stress Test by Gaussian Copula Method
In Figure 2.5, we show the impact of varying the foreign exchange volatility σ, and the
counterparty default hazard rate. Increasing either of these parameters shifts the curve up for
θ > 0. In other words, increasing the volatility of the market exposure or the level of the
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credit exposure in this example increases the potential impact of wrong-way risk, relative to
the benchmark of independent market and credit risk.






























Hazard Rate = 2%
Hazard Rate = 4%
Hazard Rate = 6%
Figure 2.5: CVA with different volatility and hazard rate
2.5.3 Portfolio CVA
We next consider a 10 year fixed-for-floating cross currency swap, in which a U.S. bank
receives a fixed rate in dollars and pays a floating rate in foreign currency, with a notional
size of $5 million. At the same time, this U.S. bank enters a 3 year and a 6 year foreign
exchange forward contract with the same counterparty in the same currency, each with a
notional of $0.5 million. We use the Vasicek model for U.S. interest rate,
drt = κr(r̄ − rt)dt+ σrdW̃t,
with parameter values (r0, r̄, σr, κr) = (0.05, 0.05, 0.0005, 0.8).
We consider three different portfolios for the U.S. bank with the same counterparty. The
first two portfolios contain multiple transactions of different maturities. The third one con-
tains a single transaction with multiple cash flows.
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Portfolio 1 : $5 million 10 year cross currency swap, $0.5 million 3 year and 6 year foreign
exchange forwards. The U.S. bank is the U.S. dollar receiver in all transactions.
Portfolio 2 : $5 million 10 year cross currency swap, $0.5 million 3 year and 6 year foreign
exchange forwards. The U.S. bank is the U.S. dollar receiver in the cross currency
swap and the U.S. dollar payer in the 3 year and 6 year forward contracts.
Portfolio 3 : A simple interest rate swap with notional size $5 million. The U.S. bank re-
ceives the floating rate and pays a fixed rate rfix = 5%.
The sample average positive exposures for these three portfolios are shown in Figure 2.6.
In the top two panels, the average positive exposure increases with time because the largest
payments are exchanged at maturity. For portfolio 1, the drop in exposure at year 3 and
year 6 results from the expiration of the foreign exchange forward contracts. For portfolio
2, since the portfolio is more balanced, the exposure path is smoother. In the bottom panel,
for portfolio 3, the average positive exposure decreases to 0 at maturity because the total
exposure decreases with time in an interest rate swap.
Figure 2.7 shows CVA values as θ varies. We report CVA as a percentage of the portfolio
2 CVA in the independent case. Portfolio 1 has the greatest sensitivity to wrong-way risk
because all its transactions run in the wrong-way direction. Portfolio 2 is better diversified,
with both wrong-way and right-way transactions. Because the average positive exposure
for portfolio 1 is higher than that of portfolio 2, it has a higher CVA for all θ, and with θ
increasing, portfolio 1 attains much higher CVA values near the worst-case bound than does
the more diversified portfolio 2. For portfolio 3, because of its lower and less concentrated
positive exposure, the CVA bound is much lower compared with the other two portfolios.
37


















































Figure 2.6: Sample Average Positive Exposures for Three Portfolios.
















Figure 2.7: CVA Bounds for Three Portfolios.
Figure 2.8 shows the sensitivity of the CVA estimates to a change in the counterparty’s
default hazard rate. We increase the hazard rate by 1 basis point from λ = 0.04 to λ′ =
0.0401 and show the estimated change in CVA using dual variables and the actual difference
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based on resolving the optimization problem at each θ. To put these sensitivities in perspec-
tive, the CVA estimate at θ = 0 is $11,241, and at θ = 20, it is $62,659. The sensitivities
in Figure 2.8 are in dollars. Overall, the dual variables provide good estimates of the change
in CVA under a small change in the default probability. Compared with resolving the op-
timization problem at the perturbed λ, the dual variables slightly underestimate the change
in wrong-way scenarios (θ > 0) and overestimate the change in the right-way scenarios
(θ < 0).













Estimate by Dual Variable
Model Value
Figure 2.8: Change in CVA for a 1 basis point change in hazard rate at various levels of the
penalty parameter θ.
2.6 Adding Expectation Constraints
When additional information is available, we can often improve our CVA bound by incor-
porating the information through constraints on the optimization problem. Constraints on
expectations are linear constraints on joint distributions and thus particularly convenient in
our framework.
Recall that we think of the exposure path X as the output of a simulation of a mar-
ket model. Such a model generates many other market variables, and in specifying the
39
joint distribution between the market and credit models, we may want to add constraints
through other variables. Constraints represent relationships between market and credit risk
that should be preserved as the joint distribution varies. To incorporate such constraints, we
expand the simulation output from X to (X,Z), where the random vector Z = (Z1, . . . , Zd)
represents a path of auxiliary variables. The joint law of (X,Z) is determined by the market
model. We want to add a constraint of the form E[Zτ1{τ ≤ td}] = z0, for given z0, when
the expectation is taken with respect to the joint law of the market and credit models. This is
a constraint on the expectation of < Z, Y >.
As a specific illustration, suppose Z̃ is a martingale generated by the market model and
we want to impose the constraint E[Z̃τ∧td ] = z0 on the joint law of Z̃ and τ . This is equivalent
to the constraint E[(Z̃td − Z̃τ )1{τ ≤ td}] = 0, so we can define Zj = Z̃d− Z̃j , j = 1, . . . , d,
and then impose the constraint E[< Z, Y >] = 0.
To incorporate constraints, we redefine p to denote the joint law of (X,Z) on Rd × Rd;
we continue to use q for the marginal law of Y . Let Π(p, q) be the set of probability measures
on (Rd×Rd)×Rd with the specified marginals of (X,Z) and Y . We denote by hX(x, z) = x
and hZ(x, z) = z the projections of (x, z) to x and z respectively. Set
Π̄(p, q) = {µ ∈ Π(p, q) :
∫
< hZ(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y) = v0}. (2.6.1)
We will assume that Π̄(p, q) is nonempty so that the problem is feasible.
Given independent samples (Xi, Zi), i = 1, . . . , N , let pN denote their empirical mea-
sure. As before qN denotes the empirical measure for N independent copies of Y . Even if
Π̄(p, q) is nonempty, we cannot assume that the equality constraint in (2.6.1) holds for some
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element of Π(pN , qN), so for finite N we will need a relaxed formulation. Let Πε(pN , qN)
denote the set of joint distributions on {((Xi, Zi), yj), i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , d + 1} with
marginals pN and q̃, where
max
1≤j≤d+1
|qN(yj)− q̃(yj)| < ε,
and define
Π̄ε(pN , qN) =
{
µ ∈ Πε(pN , qN) :
∣∣∣∣∫ < hZ(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y)− v0∣∣∣∣ < ε} . (2.6.2)
In our convergence analysis, we will let ε ≡ εN decrease to zero as N increases.
Let ν ∈ Π(p, q) denote the independent case dν((x, z), y) = dp(x, z)dq(y), and let
νN ∈ Π(pN , qN) denote the independent case dνN((x, z), y) = dpN(x, z)dqN(y). We will
assume that v0 is chosen so that ν ∈ Π̄(p, q). It then follows that νN ∈ Π̄ε(pN , qN) for all
sufficiently large N , for all ε > 0.





< hX(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y) (2.6.3)







< Xi, yj > µ((Xi, Zi), yj). (2.6.4)
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This is a linear programming problem: the objective and the constraints are linear in the
variables µ((Xi, Zi), yj). The following result establishes convergence of the estimator.








(ii) Π̄(p, q) contains the independent joint distribution ν.
Then with εN = 1/Nα for any α ∈ (0, 1/2), the finite sample estimate converges to the
constrained worst-case CVA for the limiting problem; i.e., cN,εN → c∞, a.s.
We define a penalty formulation with θ > 0 for the limiting problem,
sup
µ∈Π̄(p,q)








and with (2.6.2) for the finite problem,
max
µ∈Π̄ε(pN ,qN )










The corresponding convergence result given by the following theorem.







2dp(x, z) <∞, and
Eν [eθ<hX(X,Z),Y >] <∞;
(ii) Π̄(p, q) contains the independent joint distribution ν.
Then with εN = 1/Nα for any α ∈ (0, 1/2), the following hold,
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1. max
µ∈Π̄εN (pN ,qN )
G(µ, νN) −→ sup
µ∈Π̄(p,q)
G(µ, ν), a.s.
2. The maximizer µ̄∗N ∈ Π̄εN (pN , qN) of G(·, νN) converges weakly to a maximizer µ̄∗ ∈
Π̄(p, q) of G(·, ν).
3. The penalized worst-case CVA converges to the true value, a.s.; i.e.,
∫
< x, y > dµ̄∗N →
∫
< x, y > dµ̄∗, a.s. (2.6.5)
2.7 Bilateral CVA
In previous sections, the CVA bound we discussed is for unilateral CVA. In this section we
show that this methodology extends easily to bilateral CVA.
We keep the existing notations, and in addition let τs denote the default time of the agent
itself. Then the bilateral CVA for a time horizon T is the expected positive exposure at the
default of the counterparty, which happens before the default of the agent itself,
BCVA = E[V +(τ)1{τ ≤ τs ∧ T}],
given joint law for the default times τ and τs, and the exposure V +(t).
There are two ways to approach this problem with different levels of information. If the
joint distribution of the counterparty’s default time τ and the agent’s self-default time τs is
known, or if it is the result of a more extensive credit model, then we define
X = (V +(t1), . . . , V
+(td)) and Y = (1{τ = t1, τs ≥ t1}, . . . ,1{τ = td, τs ≥ td}).
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Note that Y has the support of the finite set {y1, . . . , yd+1}, with y1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , yd =
(0, 0, . . . , 1), and yd+1 = (0, . . . , 0). Each yj has probability q(yj) = P (τ = tj, τs ≥ tj) for
j = 1, ..., d, and q(yj) = 1−
∑d
k=1 q(yj) for j = d + 1. These probabilities may be known
or estimated from simulation of N independent copies Y1, . . . , YN of Y , in which case we
denote the empirical frequency of each yj by qN(yj). Then the bilateral CVA formulation for
the worst-case and penalty case follow the same as earlier discussed, except for the changes
in Y ’s definition and marginal.
The joint distribution of default times of both parties is usually not available. In a more
general case, we define
X = (V +(t1), . . . , V
+(td)) , Y = (1{τ = t1}, . . . ,1{τ = td}),
and
W = (1{τs ≥ t1}, . . . ,1{τs ≥ td}).
The problem of calculating bilateral CVA reduce to the problem of calculating the ex-
pectation of the following function,






V +(tj)1{τ = tj}1{τs ≥ tj} = V +(τ)1{τ ≤ τs ∧ T},
if the joint law for X , Y and W were known.
We continue to use p and q to denote the marginal law of X and Y , and let qs to denote
marginal of W . Furthermore, note that W is supported on the finite set {w1, . . . , wd}, with
w1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), w2 = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . wd = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Each wj has probability
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qs(wj) = P (τs = tj) for j = 1, ..., d − 1 and qs(wj) = P (τs ≥ tj) for j = d. Define
Π(p, q, qs) to be the set of probability measures on Rd×Rd×Rd with marginals p, q and qs.






C(x, y, w)dµ(x, y, w). (2.7.1)
We extend the CVA formulation to 3-dimensional, by including the self-default time of
the agent, for bilateral CVA. IPFP algorithm still applies to the tempered bilateral CVA.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
We have focused in this chapter on the problem of bounding wrong-way risk in CVA cal-
culation, taking the marginal models for market and credit risk as given and varying the
dependence between the two. Put more generally, the problem we have addressed is one of
bounding the expected inner product between two random vectors with fixed marginals. A
key feature of our setting is that these marginals need not be known explicitly. Instead, they
are outputs of the simulation of potentially very complex models, of the type used to model
asset prices and default times.
Calculating the worst-case bound for the exact marginal distributions is typically infea-
sible. But using simulated outcomes, the problem reduces to a tractable linear program-
ming problem. We extend this formulation by penalizing deviations from a reference model,
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which results in a convex optimization problem. In both cases, we prove convergence of
the solutions calculated from simulated outcomes to the corresponding solutions using exact
distributions as the sample size grows. The approach is sufficiently general and flexible to
be applicable to many other settings in which the nature of dependence between different
model components is unknown.
An important practical problem is the choice of the penalty parameter θ, which reflects
the user’s confidence in the reference model. A large θ leads to more conservative values;
a small θ produces values very close to the reference model. Inevitably, the choice of θ
involves some judgment. However, this judgment is best anchored in observable data. In
our examples, each value of θ implies some level of correlation between the exchange rate
and the credit spread for the counterparty. This correlation is a limited measure that cannot
determine the full dependence between the market and credit risk models, but it can help pin
down an appropriate value for θ.
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Chapter 3
Realization Utility with Adaptive
Reference Point
3.1 Introduction
In neoclassical finance, investors trade financial assets to maximize their utility of con-
sumption or utility of terminal wealth. Optimal trading in this regard has been studied for
decades. Recently, it has been found that in addition to intermediate consumption and termi-
nal wealth, investors are also sensitive to trading gains and losses; see for example Barberis
and Huang [4], Barberis and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll and Jin [38].
Realization utility is first explicitly modeled by Barberis and Xiong [6]. They assume that
investors think of their investing experience as a series of separate episodes, and they receive
utility burst when a gain or a loss is realized. Assuming a piecewise linear realization utility
function, the authors find that the investors never voluntarily sell a stock at a loss. Ingersoll
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and Jin [38] extend the model by assuming an S-shaped realization utility function and find
that the investors voluntarily sell a stock both at a gain and at a loss.
In this chapter, we extend the works by Barberis and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll and Jin [38]
in two aspects: First, in addition to realization utility, the agent in our model also experiences
utility from her terminal wealth. The terminal wealth utility is modeled by the expected
utility theory. Second, the reference point that decides whether a payoff is experienced by
the agent as a gain or as a loss is assumed to adapt to the stock’s prior gain and loss, and the
adaptation to the gain is more than to the loss. By contrast, Ingersoll and Jin [38] assume
the reference point to be fixed at the purchase price, and Barberis and Xiong [6] assume the
reference point to be the purchase price growing at the risk-free rate. Experimental evidence
in Baucells et al. [9] and Arkes et al. [1, 2] reveals that when selling a stock, most investors
choose their reference points to be the purchase price plus a portion of the prior paper gain
and loss of the stock. Moreover, the reference point adapts more to a prior gain than to a
prior loss. Therefore, our model is more consistent with individuals’ behavior observed in
the literature.
We assume that the agent can trade one risk-free asset and multiple stocks with the same
constant expected return and volatility, but she can only invest in one of these assets at one
time. In other words, the agent can only switch her position between the risk-free asset and
a stock. We formulate the agent’s trading problem as an optimal stopping problem. We
first provide sufficient and necessary conditions under which the optimal value of the agent’s
trading problem is finite. We then find the optimal purchase time of the stock: the agent
either immediately or never re-purchases the stock after selling it. We also prove that it is
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optimal to hold the stock if it is already at a deep loss. Finally, we prove that the value
function of the trading problem is the unique solution to a variational inequality, and we
develop an efficient algorithm to solve the value function and the optimal trading strategy.
In the study of trading strategies and asset pricing, we distinguish two types of agents:
adaptive agents and naive agents. An adaptive agent knows today that her reference point
in the future will adapt to the prior gain and loss of the stock, and thus knows today that
the gain and loss she will experience in the future will change accordingly. When making
decisions today, the adaptive agent already takes this knowledge into account. For a naive
agent, her reference point in the future will also adapt to the stock’s gain and loss, but she
doesn’t realize it prospectively: the naive agent wrongly believes that her reference point will
remain constant over time. Therefore, the naive agent plans her trading strategy based on this
wrong belief. At each time in the future, however, the naive agent realizes retrospectively that
her reference point has changed, but she still fails to realize prospectively that her reference
point will continue to adapt to the stock’s gain and loss. Because the reference point has
changed, when re-examining the trading problem, the naive agent finds that the strategy that
was planned before is no longer optimal and thus changes to a new strategy. As time goes
by, the naive agent changes her strategy constantly.
Note that the inconsistency in the liquidation strategy between the selves of the naive
agent at different times arises from the adaptation of the reference point to the stock’s gain
and loss. Inconsistent dynamic decisions have been extensively observed and studied in the
literature as a result of hyperbolic discounting (O’Donoghue and Rabin [43]), probability
weighting (Barberis [3]), and mean-variance criteria (Basak and Chabakauri [7]). As far as
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we know, our work is the first one to show that time-varying reference points can also lead
to dynamic inconsistency. The naive agent studied in this dissertation is similar to those
considered in the dynamic inconsistency literature.
We have the following three main findings in the trading strategies of the adaptive and
naive agents: First, the adaptive agent sells the stock more (less) frequently when the stock
is at a gain (at a loss) than the naive agent does. When comparing to a non-adaptive agent
whose reference point does not adapt to the stock’s gain and loss, the naive agent sells the
stock less frequently both at a gain and at a loss. The adaptive agent sells the stock at a loss
less frequently than the non-adaptive agent does as well.
Second, when the reference point adapts more to stock’s gain, the naive agent sells the
stock at a gain less frequently because she actually experiences less gain for the same amount
of increase in stock’s price. The naive agent’s selling policy when the stock is at a loss,
however, is unaffected. Similarly, when the reference point adapts more to the stock’s loss,
the naive agent sells the stock at a loss less frequently, but the selling policy at a gain does not
change. For the adaptive agent, when the reference point adapts more to the stock’s gain, she
sells the stock at a loss less frequently. When the reference point adapts more to the stock’s
loss, the adaptive agent sells the stock at a loss more frequently, which is the opposite to the
behavior of the naive agent.
Third, when becoming more concerned with the terminal wealth utility, both the adaptive
and naive agents sell the stock less frequently both at a gain and at a loss. In the extreme
case in which the agents are only concerned with their terminal wealth utility, they will never
trade the stock because trading incurs transaction costs without improving wealth (because
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the stock’s expected return and volatility are assumed to be constant). Therefore, trading is
generated in our model because of realization utility.
We also study asset pricing implications of our model. For each stock in the market, we
define the equilibrium risk premium of the stock as the expected excess return such that the
investors in the market are indifferent between the stock and the risk-free asset. We consider
two markets: one with investors that are homogeneous adaptive agents, and the other with
investors that are homogeneous naive agents. We have four main findings: First, adaptive
agents require a higher risk premium than naive agents do.
Second, when the reference point adapts more to the stock’s gain, the adaptive agent asks
for a higher risk premium for the stock because the same increase in the stock price leads
to less realization utility in this case. Similarly, when the reference point adapts more to the
stock’s loss, the stock is rewarded with a lower risk premium because the same decrease in
the stock price yields less realization disutility. On the other hand, the risk premium required
by the naive agent is insensitive to the degree to which the reference point adapts to the
stock’s gain or loss. This is because the naive agent does not realize prospectively that her
reference point will change in the future. As a result, when buying the stock, the value of the
stock from the naive agent’s perspective does not depend on how the reference point actually
changes in the future.
Third, the risk premium becomes higher when the naive and adaptive agents become
more concerned with the terminal wealth utility. This is because both agents become more
risk averse in this case.
Fourth, the risk premium can be positive or negative and can be increasing or decreas-
51
ing with respect to the stock volatility, depending on the type of agents in the market and
on model parameter values. Thus, our model can generate different patterns of return-risk
tradeoffs for stocks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Chapter 3.2, we propose our
model and formulate the trading problem. In Chapter 3.3, we solve the trading problem. In
Chapter 3.4, we compare the trading strategies of the naive and adaptive agents and study
the sensitivity of the strategies with respect to model parameters. In Chapter 3.5, we study
the asset pricing implications of our model. Chapter 3.6 provides extensions of our model
and Chapter 3.7 concludes. Appendix B contains all the proofs and Appendix C provides the
algorithm used to solve the trading problem.
3.2 Model
Consider an agent who makes a sequence of purchase and sale decisions to take positions in
stocks. Following Barberis and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll and Jin [38], we assume that at any
time the agent can invest her money only in one of the stocks or in a risk-free asset. In other
words, the agent does not diversify her portfolio and only decides in which asset she invests
her money.
The risk-free rate is assumed to be constant r. The prices of the stocks that the agent can
trade are assumed to follow geometric Brownain motions with the same appreciation rate µ
and volatility σ (though the prices can be driven by different Brownain motions). Because
the agent can invest only in one asset at one time, we can simply assume that the agent
can only trade one stock with price dynamics dSt = µStdt + σStdWt, where {Wt}t≥0 is a
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standard Brownian motion. Note that this setting is the same as in Barberis and Xiong [6]
and Ingersoll and Jin [38].
We assume a proportional transaction cost kp of buying the stock and a proportional
transaction cost ks of selling the stock. Consequently, x dollars to be invested in the stock
becomes x/(1 + kp) dollars value of stock after the purchase cost is deducted and y dollars
value of the stock position becomes y(1 − ks) dollars after the position is liquidated. We
assume no transaction cost of buying and selling the risk-free asset.
The investment horizon of the agent is a Poisson shock time τ̃ that is independent of the
Brownain motion {Wt}t≥0 that drives the stock price. In other words, τ̃ is exponentially dis-
tributed and we assume its rate parameter to be ρ. Consequently, the mean of the investment
horizon is 1/ρ. When the shock time arrives, the agent has to liquidate all the assets she
holds.
In the following, we denote Ft as the information available at time t, i.e., Ft is the σ-
algebra generated by Ws and 1{τ̃>s}, s ≤ t, and denote Et as the expectation conditioning
on Ft.
The agent experiences the utility of her wealth at the end of the investment horizon.
In addition, the agent also experiences realization utility every time she sells the stock, no
matter the sale is voluntary before the shock time τ̃ or is forced at τ̃ . We use expected utility
theory (EUT) to model the terminal wealth utility. Suppose the current time is t and the
wealth at τ̃ > t is X , then the utility of this wealth is defined to be Et[e−δ(τ̃−t)UW (X)],
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where
UW (x) = θx
β. (3.2.1)
Here, δ > 0 is a discount factor for utility and β ∈ (0, 1] determines the relative risk aversion
of the agent regarding random wealth. Later on, we will aggregate the terminal wealth utility
and realization utility by adding them together, so parameter θ ≥ 0 represents the relative
weight of the terminal wealth utility to the latter. If θ = 0, the agent does not experience
terminal wealth utility, and if θ → +∞, realization utility disappears.
On the other hand, we use cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky and Kahneman
[40, 53]) to model realization utility. Suppose the current time is t and the agent sells the
stock at τ > t. Then, the realization utility of this sale is Et[e−δ(τ−t)U(Gτ−, Rτ−)]. Here,
we use the same discount factor δ as for the discounting of the terminal wealth utility. Gτ−
stands for the gain and loss experienced by the agent for realization utility when she sells
the stock at τ , and Rτ− is the reference point the agent uses at τ to determine that gain and
loss. The function U is S-shaped with respect to G and satisfies U(0, R) = 0, as suggested
in CPT. We will model Gτ− and Rτ− momentarily.
Let Xt be the agent’s wealth, i.e., the book value of the agent’s position in the stock or
in the risk-free asset. Between a purchase time ζi of the stock and the following sale time τi,
Xt grows in the same way as the stock price, i.e.,
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dWt, t ∈ [ζi, τi).
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Between a sale time τi of the stock and the following purchase time ζi+1, Xt grows at the
risk-free rate, i.e.,
dXt = rXt dt, t ∈ [τi, ζi+1).





·Xζi−, Xτi = (1− ks) ·Xτi−.
Note that we choose the right-continuous version of X , so if there is a purchase or sale at t,
Xt and Xt− stand for the agent’s wealth after and before the transaction cost being deducted,
respectively.
Next, let us specify the reference point and the gain and loss of the agent at each sale
time. Denote Pt as the purchase price at the latest purchase time prior to t, i.e., Pt := Xζi
for t ∈ [ζi, ζi+1) and two consecutive purchase times ζi < ζi+1. Ingersoll and Jin [38]
assume that the agent uses the purchase price Pt as the reference point. Barberis and Xiong
[6] assume that the reference point is the purchase price growing at the risk-free rate, i.e.,
Pte
r(t−ζi) for t ∈ [ζi, ζi+1).
Experimental evidence in Baucells et al. [9] and Arkes et al. [1, 2], however, reveals that
individuals adapt their reference points to prior paper gains and losses of the asset they trade
and the adaptation to a gain is more than to a comparable loss. Therefore, we model the
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reference point as follows:
Rt = R(Xt, Pt) :=

Pt + γ+(Xt − Pt), Xt ≥ Pt,
Pt + γ−(Xt − Pt), Xt < Pt.
Note that Xt−Pt stands for the paper gain and loss of the stock since the last purchase time,
so γ± ∈ [0, 1] model the asymmetric adaptation of the reference point to the stock’s gain
and loss. Consequently, the reference point the agent employs to calculate realization utility
when selling the stock at τi is Rτi− and the resulting gain or loss is Gτi− = Xτi− −Rτi−.
We assumeU(G,R) to be homogeneous of degree β ∈ (0, 1], i.e, U(G,R) = RβU (G/R, 1).
Note that β here is the same as the relative risk aversion index of the utility function UW for
terminal wealth. Denote u(x) := U(x, 1), x ∈ R. We assume that u(·) is strictly increasing
and u(0) = 0. Furthermore, we assume u(x) is concave for x ≥ 0 and convex for x ≤ 0,
representing the agent’s risk averse attitude regarding gains and risk seeking attitude regard-
ing losses. Finally, the same amount of gain G > 0 yields less utility when the reference
point R is higher and the same loss G < 0 yields more disutility when the reference point R
is lower. Thus, we assume that U(G,R) is decreasing in R when G > 0 and is increasing in
R when G < 0. It is straightforward to show that this assumption is equivalent to assuming
xu′(x)/u(x) ≥ β, x 6= 0. (3.2.2)
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For example, the following function
u(x) = [(x+ bG)
αG − bαGG ]1{x≥0} − λ [(−x+ bL)
αL − bαLL ]1{x<0} (3.2.3)
with λ > 0, αG, αL ∈ [β, 1], and bG, bL ≥ 0 satisfies (3.2.2). Ingersoll and Jin [38] consider
cases of bG, bL both equal to 0 and both equal to 1. If bG = bL = 0 and αG = αL = β,
U(G,R) = Gβ1{G≥0} − λ(−G)β1{G<0}, which is the same as the utility function used in
Tversky and Kahneman [53]. On the other hand, the piece-wise exponential utility function,
i.e., u(x) = (1− e−αGx)1{x≥0} − λ(1− eαLx)1{x<0} for some αG, αL ≥ 0, does not satisfy
(3.2.2).
Because R(Xt, Pt) = PtR(Xt/Pt, 1), we have
U(Gt, Rt) = R
β


















Therefore, if we denote













, x ≥ 1,





, x < 1,
we have U(Gt, Rt) = P
β
t ū(Xt/Pt). In addition, note that ū(x) is increasing and continuous













α γ+ = 0,
β γ+ > 0,
(3.2.4)
assuming the limit exist. Because u(x) is concave for x ≥ 0 and u(0) = 0, we have u(x) ≥
xu′(x), showing that α ≤ 1. On the other hand, condition (3.2.2) leads to α ≥ β. For u(·)
defined as in (3.2.3), α = αG.
Suppose right before time t, the agent is holding the stock. Then, the agent’s decision
is {Fs}-stopping times t ≤ τ1 ≤ ζ2 ≤ τ2 ≤ ζ3 ≤ . . . , where ζk’s and τk’s are purchase



























, s ≥ t,
Ps = Xζi , s ∈ [ζi, ζi+1), i ≥ 2, Xt− = x, Ps− = p, s ∈ [t, ζ2],
Rs = R(Xs, Ps), Gs = Xs −Rs, s ≥ t.
(3.2.5)
The first term in the objective function of (3.2.5) stands for the realization utility when a sale
1Here, we set ζ1 := −∞.
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τi occurs before the shock time (i.e., the terminal time) τ̃ . The second term is the utility of
wealth at the terminal time if the agent is holding the risk-free asset then. The third term is
the realization utility and the utility of wealth at the terminal time if the agent is holding the
stock then. Note that in this case, the wealth that after the stock is sold is (1− ks)Xτ̃−. The
agent’s wealth grows in the same way as the stock does when the agent is holding the stock,
i.e., when s ∈ [ζi, τi), and grows at the risk-free rate when the agent is holding the risk-free
asset, i.e., when s ∈ [τi, ζi+1). In addition, the wealth decreases by factors ks and kp/(1+kp)
at each sale and purchase times, respectively, due to the transaction cost. The purchase price
is re-adjusted to the agent’s wealth at each purchase time of the stock and remains at constant
until the next purchase time.
On the other hand, if the agent is holding the risk-free asset right before time t, the agent’s
decision is {Fs}-stopping times t ≤ ζ1 ≤ τ1 ≤ ζ2 ≤ τ2 ≤ ζ3 ≤ . . . , where ζk’s and τk’s are




























, s ≥ t,
Ps = Xζi , s ∈ [ζi, ζi+1), i ≥ 1, Xt− = x,
Rs = R(Xs, Ps), Gs = Xs −Rs, s ≥ τ1.
(3.2.6)
Finally, the optimal liquidation and purchase problems can be formulated similarly when
there is no shock time, i.e., when ρ = 0. Indeed, in this case, we simply replace the objective






we allow the stopping times to take +∞, which stands for the case in which the agent never
purchases or voluntarily sells the stock.
Our model differs from those in Ingersoll and Jin [38] and Barberis and Xiong [6] mainly
in two aspects: First, the agent in our model experiences terminal wealth utility in additional
to realization utility. Second, the agent’s reference point in our model adapts to the stock’s
prior gain and loss. A detailed comparison is provided in Table 3.1.
2Here, we set τ0 = −∞.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of the model settings in the present dissertation and in Ingersoll and




Ingersoll and Jin Barberis and Xiong
Realization
Utility Function








Shock Time Yes No Yes




Asset Pricing Yes No Yes
3.3 Solution
3.3.1 Well-Posedness Condition
Denote V (x, p) and V̄ (x) as the optimal values of (3.2.5) and (3.2.6), respectively. We first
show the condition for problems (3.2.5) and (3.2.6) to have finite optimal values. To this
end, define K := (1− ks)/(1 + kp).
Proposition 3.3.1. 1. If δ + ρ > max{βr, βµ − β(1−β)
2
σ2, ᾱµ − ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2} and K < 1,
then V (x, p) < +∞ and V̄ (x) < +∞ for any x ≥ 0, p > 0.





V (x, p) = V̄ (x) = +∞ for any x > 0 and p > 0.




σ2}, then V (x, p) =
V̄ (x) = +∞ for any x > 0 and p > 0.
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4. Suppose ρ > 0 and θ = 0. If δ+ ρ < ᾱµ− ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2, then V (x, p) = V̄ (x) = +∞ for
any x > 0 and p > 0.
Proposition 3.3.1 provides a sufficient condition for the optimal values of problems
(3.2.5) and (3.2.6) to be finite, and this condition is nearly necessary in the case in which
ρ > 0 and θ > 0 and in the case in which ρ = 0. To understand this condition, we regard
δ + ρ, the sum of the discount rate of the agent’s utility and the shock rate, as the effective
discount rate of the agent. Suppose ρ > 0 and θ > 0. We can consider βr to be the growth
rate of the agent’s terminal wealth utility if she holds the risk-free asset. For the optimal
values of problems (3.2.5) and (3.2.6) to be finite, it is necessary that this growth rate is
smaller than the effective discount factor. Similarly, βµ − β(1−β)
2
σ2 and ᾱµ − ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2 can
be understood as the growth rates of the agent’s terminal wealth utility and realization utility,
respectively, if she holds the stock. Thus, it is also necessary that these two growth rates are
less than the effective discount rate.
In the case in which ρ = 0, for the optimal values of problems (3.2.5) and (3.2.6) to be
finite, it is also necessary that the growth rate of the agent’s realization utility ᾱµ− ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2
is smaller than the discount rate δ. On the other hand, βr needs to be smaller than δ as well;
otherwise, the agent can hold the risk-free asset to let her wealth grow to infinity and finally
invest in the stock to receive positive realization utility for each unit of her wealth. Similarly,
βµ− β(1−β)
2
σ2 must be smaller than δ too; otherwise, the agent can hold the stock to let her
wealth grow to infinity.
Note that the optimal liquidation problem studied by Ingersoll and Jin [38] is a special
case of our model with δ = 0 and γ± = 0. Ingersoll and Jin [38, Section C] provide a
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necessary condition under which the value of their problem is finite, but sufficient conditions
are not provided.
In the case in which ρ > 0 and θ = 0, there is a gap between the sufficient and necessary
conditions, but the gap is small. Indeed, with reasonable parameter values (e.g., µ−1
2
σ2 ≥ r),




σ2} = ᾱµ− ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2 because ᾱ ≥ β.
Finally, 1 −K stands for the transaction cost of buying and selling the stock once. The
presence of transaction cost, i.e., assuming K < 1, prevents the agent from trading the stock
for infinite number of times in a finite time interval.
In view of Proposition 3.3.1, the following assumption is in force throughout the rest of
this chapter:





3.3.2 Optimal Purchase Time
We first show the continuity of the value functions V (x, p) and V̄ (x) and the following
dynamic programming principle.
Proposition 3.3.2. V̄ (x) and V (x, p) are homogeneous of degree β. Moreover, V (x, 1) is
continuous in x ≥ 0 and |V (x, 1)| ≤ C(1 + xα̃),∀x ≥ 0 for some C > 0 and α̃ ∈ [ᾱ, 1].
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Furthermore, the following dynamic programming principle holds:




e−δ(τ−t)(U(Gτ−, Rτ−) + V̄ ((1− ks)Xτ−))1{τ<τ̃}
+e−δ(τ̃−t)(U(Gτ̃−, Rτ̃−) + UW ((1− ks)Xτ̃ ))1{τ̃≤τ}
]
,
subject to dXs = µXs ds+ σXs dWs, s ≥ t, Xt− = x,
Rs = R(Xs, p), Gs = Xt − p, s ≥ t,
(3.3.1)













subject to dXs = rXs ds, s ≥ t, Xt− = x.
(3.3.2)
Suppose the agent knows the optimal strategy if she is holding the risk-free asset, i.e.,
the optimal solution to problem (3.2.6). When the agent is holding the stock, she only needs
to decide the first sale time τ . If τ is before the shock time τ̃ , the agent receives realization
utility at τ , her wealth becomes (1− ks)Xτ− in the risk-free asset after the sale of the stock,
and the optimal aggregate utility she can receive afterwards is V̄ ((1− ks)Xτ−). If the shock
time occurs first, then the agent is forced to liquidate the stock and receives realization utility
and terminal wealth utility. Similarly, if the agent knows the optimal strategy if she is holding
the stock, she only needs to decide when to purchase the stock. Therefore, problems (3.3.1)
and (3.3.2) are coupled.
In the following, we denote Θ := ρθ(1− ks)β/(ρ+ δ − βr).
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Proposition 3.3.3. The optimal value of problem (3.3.2) is
V̄ (x) = (1− ks)−β max(KβV (1, 1),Θ)xβ. (3.3.3)
Furthermore,
1. If V (1, 1) > ΘK−β , ζ = t is optimal to problem (3.3.2).
2. If V (1, 1) < ΘK−β , ζ = +∞ is optimal to problem (3.3.2).
3. If V (1, 1) = ΘK−β , any stopping time ζ ≥ t is optimal to problem (3.3.2).
Proposition 3.3.3 shows that when holding the risk-free asset, it is either optimal to im-
mediately re-purchase the stock or optimal to hold the risk-free asset forever. In other words,
the stock is more valuable than the risk-free asset if and only if V (1, 1) > ΘK−β , i.e., if and
only if the optimal utility of holding the stock exceeds some threshold.
3.3.3 Liquidation at A Deep Loss
Note that the objective function in the optimal liquidation problem (3.2.5) is homogeneous in
(x, p) of degree β for each fixed decision t ≤ τ1 ≤ ζ2 ≤ . . . Therefore, we can set p = 1 in
problem (3.2.5) without loss of generality. In this regard, Xt stands for the wealth-purchase























subject to dXs = µXs ds+ σXs dWs, s ≥ t, Xt− = x,
(3.3.4)
where v(x) := V (x, 1).
The following proposition shows that it is optimal to hold the stock at a deep loss.
Proposition 3.3.4. There exist ε > 0 such that it is optimal to hold the stock when the










When the agent’s position in the stock is at a deep loss, i.e., when the agent nearly loses
all her investment in the stock, the agent’s wealth is nearly zero. If the agent liquidates
the stock in this case, she will experience negative realization utility immediately, reset the
reference point, and experience realization utility and terminal wealth utility in the future.
Because the agent’s wealth is nearly zero, the utility in the future is also nearly zero, so the
total utility of the agent if she liquidates the stock in deep loss is approximately the negative
realization utility that will be immediately experienced by the agent at the liquidation time.
If the agent does not liquidate the stock, e.g., holds the stock until the shock time, the only
possible negative utility that will be experienced by the agent is at the shock time. This utility
is less magnificent than the realization utility experienced by the agent if she liquidates the
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stock immediately for two reasons: First, the agent discounts utility over time (e.g., δ > 0);
Second, the possible loss at the shock time is unlikely to be larger than the paper loss today
(because the agent already loses nearly all her wealth today). Therefore, liquidating the stock
at a deep loss is always strictly suboptimal.
In the model proposed by Barberis and Xiong [6], the agents do not voluntarily sell at
any loss level. In the model proposed by Ingersoll and Jin [38], the authors did not discuss
specifically whether the agent sells at a deep loss.
3.3.4 Variational Inequality
We first derive the variational inequality satisfied by v(·) heuristically. Comparing two strate-






































In the following theorem, we prove that value function v(x) of problem (3.3.4) is indeed
the unique viscosity solution to the variational inequality (3.3.5).3
Theorem 3.3.1. Value function v(x) of problem (3.3.4) is the unique continuous viscosity
solution with linear growth to variational inequality (3.3.5).
3.4 Trading Strategies
3.4.1 Two Types of Agents
Adaptive Agents
In this section, we discuss the trading strategies of two types of agents: adaptive agents and
naive agents. An adaptive agent knows today that her reference point in the future will adapt
to the stock’s gain and loss, and thus knows today that the gain and loss she will experience in
the future are benchmarked to this adaptive reference point. Therefore, the adaptive agent’s
trading strategy follows the optimal solutions to problems (3.2.5) and (3.2.6).
The optimal purchase time of the stock for the adaptive agent has been solved in Propo-
sition 3.3.3: it is either optimal to immediately buy the stock or optimal never to buy it. The
optimal sale time of the stock for the adaptive agent is the solution to problem (3.3.4). Recall
3For the notion of viscosity solutions, one can refer to Crandall, Ishii and Lions [24].
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that the value function v(x) of problem (3.3.4) is continuous and is the unique viscosity solu-





which stands for the immediate payoff if the agent sells the stock, is also continuous. Denote
H as the holding region, i.e.,





Then, the standard optimal stopping theory shows that the optimal sale time of the stock, i.e.,
the optimal solution to problem (3.3.1), is the first time when the wealth-purchase price ratio
Xt/Pt exits the holding region.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the value function v(x) and the holding region; the parameter values
used for this figure are provided in Section 3.4.2. In this illustration, the holding region is
disconnected: it consists of a neighbourhood of 0 and a neighbourhood of 1. In other words,
the agent holds the stock if the stock is at a deep loss (corresponding to the neighbourhood
of 0) and if the stock’s gain and loss are very small (corresponding to the neighbourhood of
1). Note that the wealth-purchase price ratio Xt/Pt is 1 at the purchase time and evolves
continuously in time. Therefore, the optimal sale time, which is the first time when the
wealth-purchase price ratio exits the holding region, becomes the first time for this ratio to
exit the neighbourhood of 1; the other part of the holding region, i.e., the neighbourhood of
0, does not play a role.
In general, we define
xu := sup{x ≥ 1|[1, x) ⊆ H}, xd := inf{x ≤ 1|(x, 1] ⊆ H}.
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utility of immediate sale
and reinvestment utility of immediate sale
and reinvestment
Figure 3.1: Value function, immediate payoff, and holding region. The solid line stands for
the optimal value function v(x) of problem (3.3.4) and the dashed line, which is partially cov-





Two graphs in the lower panel are zoom-ins of the circled areas in the upper graph. The
holding region is the area in which the dashed line is strictly below the solid line, and it
consists of two intervals, one in the neighbourhood of 1 and the other in the neighbourhood
of 0. The upper and lower liquidation points xu and xd are the end points of the interval in
the neighbourhood of 1.
Then, the optimal sale time is the first time when the wealth-purchase price ratio exits the
interval (xd, xu), and we call xu and xd the upper and lower liquidation points, respectively.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the upper and lower liquidation points; in that case, the holding region
is disconnected, so we have xd > 0. If the holding region is connected, then xd = 0, because
it is optimal to hold the stock at a deep loss.
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Naive Agents
For a naive agent, her reference point in the future will also adapt to the stock’s gain and loss,
but she doesn’t realize it prospectively: the naive agent wrongly believes that her reference
point will remain constant over time. At each purchase time ζ , the naive agent’s reference
point is the purchase price. The naive agent then believes that her reference point in the
future (before selling the asset) will still be this purchase price. Consequently, she believes
that her optimal strategy is the optimal solution to problem (3.3.1) with γ+ = γ− = 0 (so
that the reference point does not adapt to the stock’s gain and loss as believed by the agent).
Denote the corresponding upper and lower liquidation points with γ+ = γ− = 0 as x0u and
x0d, respectively. Then, the naive agent believes that it is optimal to sell the stock when
the wealth-purchase price ratio {Xs/Ps} first exits (x0u, x0d). In particular, the naive agent
believes, at the purchase time ζ , that she will sell the stock at time t > ζ if and only if
Xt/Pt /∈ (x0u, x0d).
Now, consider some time t in the future when the naive agent is still holding the stock.
Suppose the naive agent re-examines whether she needs to sell the stock. At that time, the
naive agent’s reference point actually becomes Rt = Pt + γ+(Xt − Pt)1{Xt≥Pt} + γ−(Xt −
Pt)1{Xt<Pt}, which was not expected by the agent at the purchase time but is recognized
by the agent retrospectively at time t. However, the naive agent still holds the wrong belief
that her reference point will remain constant in the future. Consequently, she believes that
her optimal strategy is the optimal solution to problem (3.3.1) with γ+ = γ− = 0 and with
p = Rt; i.e., she believes that it is optimal to sell the stock when the wealth-reference price
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ratio {Xs/Rs} first exits (x0u, x0d). In particular, the naive agent sells the stock at time t if
and only if Xt/Rt /∈ (x0u, x0d)
Note that the strategy planned by the naive agent at the purchase time ζ is different
from her strategy at the future time t when she re-examines the liquidation problem: at
time ζ the agent believes that it is optimal for her to sell the stock at time t if and only if
Xt/Pt /∈ (x0u, x0d), but at time t, she actually sells the stock if and only if Xt/Rt /∈ (x0u, x0d).
Note that Rt = Pt + γ+(Xt − Pt)1{Xt≥Pt} + γ−(Xt − Pt)1{Xt<Pt} is different from Pt.
Therefore, the naive agent is inconsistent in the liquidation strategy between herselves at
different times.
We assume the naive agent re-examines the optimal liquidation problem at any time after
the purchase time. We further assume that the naive agent is extremely naive in the sense that
she knows retrospectively that her reference point has adapted to the stock’s prior gain and
loss but never realizes prospectively the adaptation of her reference point to the stock’s gain
and loss in the future. We then study the strategy that is actually implemented by the naive
agent. From the above discussion, we observe that the naive agent implements the following
strategy: sell the stock at the first time when Xt/Rt exits (x0u, x
0
d). Denote

















Note that the inconsistency in the trading strategy between the selves of the naive agent at
different times arises from the adaptation of the reference point to the stock’s gain and loss.
Inconsistent dynamic decisions have been extensively observed and studied in the literature.
For instance, in a decision problem formulated by O’Donoghue and Rabin [43], the agent
exhibits dynamic inconsistency due to hyperbolic discounting. In a casino gambling model
proposed by Barberis [3], the gambler is dynamically inconsistent regarding the gambling
strategy because of probability weighting. In Basak and Chabakauri [7], the authors show
that a mean-variance maximizer is dynamically inconsistent. As far as we know, our work
is the first one to show that time-varying reference points can also lead to dynamic inconsis-
tency.
The naive agent in our model seems to be unrealistic because she knows retrospectively
that her reference point has changed but never realizes prospectively that the reference point
will adapt to the stock’s gain and loss. However, this agent is the same type of naive agents as
defined and studied in the dynamic inconsistency literature; see e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin
[43] and Barberis [3]. On the other hand, another type of agents, named sophisticated agents,
are studied in the literature; see for instance O’Donoghue and Rabin [43] (where these agents
are called sophisticates) and Barberis [3] (where these agents are called sophisticated agents
without pre-commitment). The adaptive agent is related to but different from sophisticated
agents. Both these two types of agents anticipate the change of their preferences in the
future and thus make their decisions today accordingly. In addition, their strategies are both
dynamically consistent. For a sophisticated agent, she realizes her decision in the future does
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not follow the optimal plan set up today. By anticipating the strategy she will implement in
the future, which is not optimal today, the sophisticated agent revises her strategy today
accordingly. For the adaptive agent in our model, she realizes prospectively the reference
point adaptation in the future, and thus anticipates correctly the gain and loss that she will
actually experience in the future. As a result, she makes the decision today based on this
anticipation. Note that the adaptive agent does not need to anticipate the decisions of her
selves in the future in order to make a decision today.
Finally, another type of agents, named pre-committing agents, are studied in the litera-
ture; see for instance Barberis [3] (where these agents are called sophisticated agents with
pre-commitment). A pre-committing agent realizes that the optimal strategy set up today
is no longer optimal to her future selves, but she is able to commit future selves to today’s
optimal strategy usually with the help of commitment device. Such agents are unrealistic in
our stock liquidation problem, so we do not consider them. Indeed, in our problem, if an
agent realizes that her reference point in the future will adapt to the stock’s gain and loss, she
should realize immediately that the gain and loss that she will experience are benchmarked
to the adaptive reference point. Thus, she will not commit herself to follow the strategy that
is optimal under the wrong assumption that the reference point does not adapt to the stock’s
gain and loss.
3.4.2 Comparison of Trading Strategies
In this section we numerically compute the trading strategies of the naive and adaptive
agents. Table 3.2 lists the default values we use for the model parameters. Here, we as-
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Table 3.2: Values for model parameters.
µ σ r kp ks δ ρ θ
9% 30% 3% 1% 1% 5% 0.1 1
αG αL bG bL λ β γ+ γ−
0.5 0.5 0 0 2.5 0.3 0.6 0.3
sume that the realization utility function is as in (3.2.3). Note that we use the same values
as in Ingersoll and Jin [38] for parameters µ, σ, δ, kp, ks, αG, αL, bG, bL, β, and λ. On the
other hand, Ingersoll and Jin [38] do not consider the shock time, terminal wealth utility,
and reference point adaptation, so parameters ρ, θ, and γ± are not present therein. We imply
the values for γ± from the experimental results in Arkes et al. [1]: in that paper, the authors
designed several experiments to test the subjects’ reference point adaptation to $6 gain or
loss. In the gain situation, the reference point shifted upwards by an amount between $3.8 to
$5.8 and in the loss situation, the reference point shifted downwards by an amount between
$1.5 to $3.1. The choice of γ+ = 0.6 and γ− = 0.3 is consistent with these experimental
results. Following Barberis and Xiong [6], we set ρ = 0.1, so that the average shock time is
10 years. Finally, there is no clear benchmark for the value of θ. We set θ = 1 for illustration
purpose only.
Recall that the strategy implemented by the naive agent is to sell the stock when Xt/Pt
exits (xnu, x
n
d) and the strategy of the adaptive agent is to sell the stock when Xt/Pt exits
(xu, xd). Figure 3.2 illustrates the upper and lower liquidation points for the strategies of the
naive agent (dashed lines) and of the adaptive agent (solid lines) with respect to µ, σ, δ, kp,
ks, αG, αL, β, and λ, respectively. To compare our results to the literature such as Barberis
and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll and Jin [38], we also compute the strategy of a non-adaptive
agent whose reference point does not adapt to the stock’s gain and loss (i.e., whose γ± = 0),
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and plot the corresponding liquidation points x0u and x
0
d in Figure 3.2 (using dotted lines).
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, this strategy is the same as the one planned by the naive agent
immediately after she purchases the stock.





















































































































































Figure 3.2: Upper and lower liquidation points for the naive agent (dashed lines), adaptive
agent (solid lines), and non-adaptive agent (dotted lines) with respect to parameters µ, σ, δ,
kp, ks, αG, αL, β, and λ. The model parameters take values in Table 3.2.
In each panel of Figure 3.2, we study the sensitivity of the liquidation points with respect
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to one parameter while assuming default values for other parameters. For all the parameter
values used in Figure 3.2, Assumption 3.3.1 is satisfied. In some panels, there is a break
point of the curve of the lower or upper liquidation point with respect to certain parameter,
and this indicates that there is no lower or upper liquidation point when the parameter value
is beyond this break point.
We observe from Figure 3.2 that when comparing the strategies of the naive and adaptive
agents, except for the cases of a small αG and a large αL, both of the lower and upper
liquidation points for the adaptive agent are lower than that for the naive agent. In other
words, the adaptive agent sells the stock more frequently at a gain and less frequently at a
loss than the naive agent does.
In Figure 3.2, the upper liquidation point of the non-adaptive agent (whose γ± = 0) is
almost identical to and thus covered by the upper liquidation point of the adaptive agent.
We observe from Figure 3.2 that the naive agent sells the stock less frequently than the non-
adaptive agent does both at a gain and at a loss. This can also be seen analytically from
(3.4.1) and (3.4.2). The adaptive agent sells the stock at a loss less frequently than the non-
adaptive agent does as well.
The sensitivity of the naive, adaptive, and non-adaptive agents’ strategies with respect
to parameters µ, σ, δ, kp, ks, αG, αL, β, and λ is similar to the findings in Ingersoll and
Jin [38, Figure 5]. First, the upper liquidation point is close to one and the lower liquidation
point is much smaller than one and is even zero, showing that the agents sell the stock at a
gain much more frequently than at a loss. Second, the upper liquidation point is much less
affected by parameter changes than the lower liquidation point. Third, the lower liquidation
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point is decreasing with respect to µ, σ, αG, λ, β, kp, and ks, and is increasing with respect
to αL and δ. In other words, the agents hold the stock at a loss longer if the stock has a
higher expected return or a higher volatility, or if the agents are less risk averse with respect
to gains, more risk seeking with respect to losses, more loss averse, less risk averse with
respect to terminal wealth, or more patient, or if the transaction cost is higher.
In panel 3 of Figure 3.2, we observe that it is optimal for the adaptive and naive agents
not to sell the stock at a gain if αG is close to one. To explain this observation, we consider
an agent whose αG = 1 and αL is much smaller than 1. We further assume γ± = 0 for
simplicity. If the agent sells the stock at a gain, she will reset her reference point. Because
αG = 1, the increase in the realization utility due to $1 increase in the stock price is the
same before and after the reference point is reset. The reduction in the realization utility due
to $1 decrease in the stock price, however, is much larger after the reference point is reset.
This is because αL is small and thus the sensitivity of the realization utility with respect to
$1 loss is much higher when the agent is at the break-even point than when she is at a gain.
As a result, the agent is unwilling to reset the reference point, i.e., unwilling to sell the stock,
when the stock is at a gain. In the models proposed by Barberis and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll
and Jin [38], it is assumed that αG = αL = 1 and that ρ = 0, respectively, so it is optimal for
the agent in their models to voluntarily sell at certain gain.
Next, we discuss the impact of parameters γ±, θ, ρ, and r on trading strategies. Note that
such impact is not discussed in Barberis and Xiong [6] or Ingersoll and Jin [38]. Similar as in
Figure 3.2, we illustrate the naive, adaptive, and non-adaptive agents’ strategies by plotting
the corresponding upper and lower liquidation points with respect to γ±, θ, ρ, and r in Figure
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3.3 (dash lines for the naive agent’s strategy, solid lines for the adaptive agent’s strategy, and
dotted lines for the non-adaptive agent’s strategy). We have the following observations:





























































































Figure 3.3: Upper and lower liquidation points for the naive agent (dashed lines), adaptive
agent (solid lines), and non-adaptive agent (dotted lines) with respect to parameters γ±, θ, ρ,
and r. The model parameters take values in Table 3.2.
First, for the naive agent’s strategy, the lower liquidation point is independent of γ+ while
the upper liquidation point is increasing with respect to γ+. This can be seen from (3.4.1)
and (3.4.2). Similarly, the lower liquidation point is decreasing with respect to γ− and the
upper liquidation point is independent of γ−.
Second, for the adaptive agent, the lower liquidation point is decreasing with respect to
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γ+ and increasing with respect to γ−. If the agent voluntarily sells the stock to realize a loss,
she will experience negative realization utility and then reset the reference point. Note the
agent’s realization utility is less sensitive with respect to $1 increase in the stock price when
she is at a loss than when she is at the break-even point because the diminishing sensitivity
of S-shaped utility functions. Thus, the agent is willing to sell the stock so as to reset the
reference point. With a larger γ+, the sensitivity of the agent’s realization utility with respect
$1 increase in the stock price, when she is at the break-even point, becomes smaller, so the
agent is less motivated to reset the reference point. Consequently, the agent is less willing to
sell the stock at a loss. Similarly, with a larger γ−, the sensitivity of the agent’s realization
utility with respect $1 increase in the stock price, when she is at a loss, becomes smaller, so
the agent is more willing to sell the stock at a loss and to reset the reference point.
Third, with a large γ+ and a small γ−, both the upper and lower liquidation points are
smaller for the adaptive agent than for the naive agent. In other words, compared to the naive
agent, the adaptive agent sells the stock more frequently at a gain and less frequently at a
loss. Note that for most individuals, their reference points adapt more to stock gains than
to stock losses, i.e., γ+ is large and γ− is small. On the other hand, with a small γ+ and a
large γ−, which, however, is not true for a typical investor, the adaptive agent sells the stock
at a loss more frequently than the naive agent does. When γ+ becomes even smaller and
γ− becomes even larger, the adaptive agent sells the stock at a loss more frequently than the
non-adaptive agent does as well.
Fourth, a larger θ makes all of the adaptive, naive, and non-adaptive agents less willing
to sell the stock, i.e., leads to a wider holding region. Note that trading the stock boosts the
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realization utility but reduces the terminal wealth utility because of transaction costs. When
θ is larger, the agents focus more on the terminal wealth utility, so they trade the stock less
frequently. When θ exceeds certain threshold, the adaptive agent does not voluntarily sell
the stock at all.
Fifth, the lower liquidation boundary of each of the adaptive, naive, and non-adaptive
agents is increasing with respect to ρ. Note that if the agent does not sell the stock at any
loss, she will hold the stock until voluntarily selling it at a gain or forcefully selling it at the
shock time. The sale at the shock time can be possibly at a loss. With a smaller ρ, the shock
time becomes longer, and thus the agent experiences less realization disutility of the loss at
the shock time because of discounting. Therefore, the agent becomes more willing to hold
the stock at a loss today.
Finally, the risk-free rate r has no effect on the upper and lower liquidation points. In-
deed, with the parameter values used here, the agent re-purchases the stock immediately
after selling it, so the return rate of the risk-free asset does not affect the agent’s liquidation
policy.
3.5 An Asset Pricing Model
Following Barberis and Xiong [6], we consider a market in which the participants are homo-
geneous adaptive agents. We define the equilibrium expected return of the stock for adaptive
agents as the value of µ such that the adaptive agents in the market are indifferent between
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the stock and the risk-free asset. According to Theorem 3.3.3, this is the case if and only if
v(1) = K−βΘ. (3.5.1)
We can then solve the equilibrium expected return for adaptive agents from (3.5.1).
Similarly, we can also consider a market with homogeneous naive agents, and define
the equilibrium expected return of the stock for naive agents as the value of µ such that the
naive agents in the market are indifferent between the stock and the risk-free asset. Recall
that at the purchase time, a naive agent believes that her reference point does not change in
the future and plans her strategy accordingly. Thus, when deciding whether to purchase the
stock, the naive agent also believes that her reference point does not change in the future.
Consequently, the equilibrium expected return of the stock for naive agents can be solved
from (3.5.1) by setting γ+ = γ− = 0.
In the following, we compute the equilibrium risk premium of the stock, i.e., the equi-
librium expected return of the stock in excess of the risk-free rate, for naive and adaptive
agents. We use the same parameter values as in Table 3.2, except that we reset θ = 15 for
illustration purpose. Figure 3.4 shows the risk premium, denoted as µex, as functions of the
stock volatility for different values of γ± and θ. We have the following observations:
First, the risk premium required by an adaptive agent is increasing with respect to γ+ and
decreasing with respect to γ−. With a larger γ+, the same increase in the stock price leads
to less realization utility of the agent. Consequently, the stock becomes less attractive to the
agent and thus is rewarded a higher risk premium in equilibrium. Similarly, with a larger γ−,
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium risk premium from the perspectives of naive agents (left panel) and
adaptive agents (right panel) with respect to parameters γ± and θ. The default values for
model parameters are given as in Table 3.2 except that θ = 15.
the adaptive agent experiences less realization disutility of a loss of the stock, so the stock is
more attractive and thus only rewarded with a lower risk premium.
Second, for reasonable values of γ±, i.e., for γ+ > γ−, adaptive agents ask for a higher
risk premium than naive agents do. When γ+ is much smaller than γ−, e.g., γ+ = 0 and
γ− = 0.3, adaptive agents ask for a lower risk premium than naive agents do.
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Third, the risk premium is increasing with respect to θ for both naive and adaptive agents.
A larger θ implies that the agents are more concerned with their terminal wealth. Because
the agents are more risk averse regarding terminal wealth than regarding trading gains and
losses, focusing more on the terminal wealth leads to a higher risk premium.
Fourth, the risk premium can be negative for both naive and adaptive agents. Each of the
naive and adaptive agents experiences terminal wealth utility and realization utility. Since
an agent is risk averse with respect to her terminal wealth, the negative risk premium is a
result of the agent’s risk seeking behavior related to the realization utility of trading gains
and losses. Negative risk premium are also observed in Barberis and Xiong [6].
Fifth, the risk premium can be increasing or decreasing with respect to the stock volatility,
depending on the type of agents in the market and on the values of other parameters.4 In
Barberis and Xiong [6], the risk premium is negative and decreasing with respect to the
stock volatility. Thus, our model generates more patterns of return-risk tradeoffs for stocks.
Actually, with certain parameter values, our model can also generate a risk premium curve
that is first increasing and then decreasing with respect to the stock volatility, and the risk
premium is positive for high-volatility stocks, see Figure 3.5.
Finally, we illustrate the sensitivity of the risk premium with respect to other parameters
in Figures 3.6–3.7.
4In Figure 3.4, the risk premium is negative when the stock’s volatility tends to zero. This is because
in our model the agent’s reference point is the purchase price of the stock without growing at the risk-free
rate. As a result, if the stock has a positive return, which can be lower than the risk-free return, the agent
still experiences positive realization utility. When holding the risk-free asset, however, the agent does not
experience any realization utility. Consequently, a zero-volatility stock can have negative risk premium.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium risk premium under parameter values µ = 9%, σ = 30%, r = 3%,
kp = ks = 1%, δ = 5%, ρ = 0.05, θ = 52, αG = αL = 0.35, bG = bL = 0, λ = 1, β = 0.3,
γ+ = γ− = 0. Because we choose γ+ = γ− = 0, the naive and adaptive agents are the same.
3.6 Extensions
3.6.1 Transaction Cost Effect
In the previous analysis, we use the post-transaction cost purchase price Pt and pre-transaction
cost wealth Xt in the calculation of the gain and loss Gt experienced by the agent. In other
words, we assume that the agent leaves out the transaction cost of buying and selling the
stock in assessing her gain and loss. In the following, we discuss the cases in which the
transaction cost is taken into account in the calculation of the agent’s gain and loss.
Denote P̃t := (1 +kp)Pt as the pre-transaction cost purchase price and X̃t := (1−ks)Xt
as the post-transaction cost wealth. None, or one, or both of the buying cost and selling cost
of the stock can be taken into account when the agent assesses her gain and loss. Thus, we
have four combinations, as listed below.
1. Post-transaction cost purchase price Pt and pre-transaction cost wealth Xt.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium risk premium from the perspectives of naive agents (left panel) and
adaptive agents (right panel) with respect to parameters r, kp, ks, δ, and ρ. The default values
for model parameters are given as in Table 3.2 except that θ = 15.
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium risk premium from the perspectives of naive agents (left panel) and
adaptive agents (right panel) with respect to parameters αG, αL, β, and λ. The default values
for model parameters are given as in Table 3.2 except that θ = 15.
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In this case, the agent ignores the buying and selling costs of the stock in assessing her
gain and loss. Consequently, a sale immediately after a purchase has zero realization
utility. This case is explicitly modeled in section 3.2 and analyzed in the previous
sections.
2. Pre-transaction cost purchase price P̃t and pre-transaction cost wealth Xt.
In this case, the agent ignores the selling cost but takes the buying cost into account
when assessing her gain and loss. In other words, the reference point Rt is given as
R(Xt, P̃t) in the calculation of the agent’s gain and loss. The realization utility can
then be written as
U(Gt, Rt) = P̃
β
t ū(Xt/P̃t) = (1 + kp)
βP βt ū((1 + kp)
−1Xt/Pt). (3.6.1)
Therefore, the agent’s optimal sale time can be solved from (3.3.4) with ū(x) replaced
by (1+kp)βū((1+kp)−1x). We can see that in this case, selling the stock immediately
after buying it incurs negative realization utility.
3. Post-transaction cost purchase price Pt and post-transaction cost wealth X̃t.
In this case, the agent ignores the buying cost but takes the selling cost into account
when assessing her gain and loss. Consequently, the reference point Rt is given as
R(X̃t, Pt), and the realization utility is
U(Gt, Rt) = P
β
t ū(X̃t/Pt) = P
β
t ū((1− ks)Xt/Pt). (3.6.2)
Therefore, the agent’s optimal liquidation time can be solved from (3.3.4) with ū(x)
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replaced by ū((1 − ks)x). Again, in this case, selling the stock immediately after
buying it incurs negative realization utility.
4. Pre-transaction cost purchase price P̃t and post-transaction cost wealth X̃t.
In this case, the agent takes both the buying and selling costs into account when as-
sessing her gain and loss, and thus the reference point Rt is given as R(X̃t, P̃t). Then,
the realization utility is
U(Gt, Rt) = P̃
β
t ū(X̃t/P̃t) = (1 + kp)
βP βt ū(KXt/Pt).
The agent’s optimal liquidation time can be solved from (3.3.4) with ū(x) replaced
by (1 + kp)βū(Kx). Again, in this case, selling the stock immediately after buying it
incurs negative realization utility.






































































Figure 3.8: Upper and lower liquidation points for the naive agent (left panel) and for the
adaptive agent (right panel) when the agents include none, one, or both of the buying and
selling costs of the stock in assessing their gains and losses. The parameter values used here
are given as in Table 3.2.
Figure 3.8 shows the liquidation points of the naive and adaptive agents. The parameter
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Figure 3.9: Equilibrium risk premium from the perspectives of the naive agent (left panel)
and of the adaptive agent (right panel) when the agents include none, one, or both of the
buying and selling costs of the stock in assessing their gains and losses. The parameter
values used here are given as in Table 3.2 except that θ = 15.
values used here are given as in Table 3.2. The message is clear: the more cost the agent
takes into account in assessing her gain and loss, the less frequently she trades the stock both
at a gain and at a loss.
Figure 3.9 shows the equilibrium risk premium from the perspectives of the naive agent
and of the adaptive agent. The parameter values used are given as in Table 3.2 except that
θ = 15. We can observe that the more cost the agents internalizes in determining their gains
and losses, the higher risk premium they require for the stock.
3.6.2 Different Choices of Utility Functions
As observed in Ingersoll and Jin [38], with bG = bL = 0, the realization utility is extremely
sensitive to a small increase in the stock price when the agent is break even (i.e., the derivative
of u(x) is infinity at x = 0). Thus, the agent is willing to realize very small gains frequently;
i.e., she sets the upper liquidation point very close to one. Ingersoll and Jin [38] set bG =
bL = 1 in their model and find that the resulting upper liquidation point becomes much
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higher than in the case bG = bL = 0. We compute the trading strategies and equilibrium risk
premium in the previous sections for the case bG = bL = 1, and find that compared to the
case bG = bL = 0, for both naive and adaptive agents, the upper liquidation point is evidently
higher, the lower liquidation point is lower, and the equilibrium risk premium for the stock
is higher.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a trading model in which an agent decides when to sell
a stock to maximize her realization utility and terminal wealth utility. Our model extends
those by Barberis and Xiong [6] and Ingersoll and Jin [38] in two aspects: First, in addi-
tion to realization utility, the agent in our model also experiences utility from her terminal
wealth. Second, the reference point in our model adapts to the stock’s gain and loss, and the
adaptation to the gain is more than to the loss.
We have proved sufficient and necessary conditions under which the optimal value of the
agent’s trading problem is finite. We have also found the optimal purchase time of the stock:
the agent either immediately or never re-purchases the stock after selling it. We have proved
that it is optimal to hold the stock if it is already at a deep loss. We have proved that the
value function of the trading problem is the unique solution to a variational inequality.
We have considered two types of agents, adaptive agents and naive agents, in the study of
trading strategies and asset pricing. An adaptive agent knows today that her reference point
in the future will adapt to the prior gain and loss of the stock, but a naive agent fails to do
so. We have found that the adaptive agent sells the stock more (less) frequently when the
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stock is at a gain (at a loss) than the naive agent does. Moreover, when the reference point
adapts more to the stock’s loss (gain), the naive agent sells the stock at a loss (at a gain) less
frequently. The adaptive agent, however, sells the stock at a loss more frequently when the
reference point adapts more to the stock’s loss. We have also found that when becoming
more concerned with the terminal wealth utility, both the adaptive and naive agents sell the
stock less frequently both at a gain and at a loss.
We have also studied the risk premium of the stock in equilibrium. We have found that
the adaptive agent requires a higher risk premium than the naive agent does. In addition,
when the reference point adapts more to the stock’s gain (loss), the adaptive agent asks for
a higher (lower) risk premium. The risk premium required by the naive agent, however,
is insensitive to the degree to which the reference point adapts to the stock’s gain or loss.
Finally, the risk premium becomes higher when the naive and adaptive agents become more
concerned with the terminal wealth utility.
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Appendix A
Additional Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
The Wasserstein metric of order 2 between probability measures p and q on Rd is W2(p, q),
where
















< x, y > dπ(x, y).
The empirical measures pN and qN converge weakly to p and q, respectively, a.s., so it fol-
lows from Corollary 6.11 of Villani [54] thatW 22 (pN , qN)→ W 22 (p, q), a.s., andW 22 (pN , q)→








and similarly for qN . The theorem now follows from (A.1). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1








exp(θ < x, y >)dν
)
dµ. (A.1)
Theorem 3 of Rüschendorf and Thomsen [50] implies the existence of a unique optimal
solution to (A.1), which we denote by µθ.
First we show that µθ is optimal for (2.4.1)–(2.4.2) with η = η(θ). Suppose µθ is not
optimal, then there exists µη(θ) such that
∫
Rd×Rd
< x, y > dµη(θ)(x, y) >
∫
Rd×Rd




























which contradicts the optimality of µθ for the penalty problem (2.4.3).
Next we show that the mapping from θ to η(θ) is increasing. For any θ2 > θ1 > 0, let
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µθ1 and µθ2 denote optimal solution to the penalty problem with θ1 and θ2 respectively. If
µθ1 = µθ2 , then η(θ1) = η(θ2). If µθ1 6= µθ2 , then, by unique optimality of µθ2 , it holds that
∫
















Compare the first term on each side. If
∫
Rd×Rd < x, y > dµ
θ2(x, y) ≤
∫






























)dµθ1 to the right side of (A.2), the sign does not
change, which means µθ2 is optimal for the penalty problem with θ1. However that contra-
dicts the unique optimality of µθ1 . We conclude that
∫
Rd×Rd
< x, y > dµθ2(x, y) >
∫
Rd×Rd
< x, y > dµθ1(x, y).











the unique optimality of µθ1 is again contradicted, so we have
η(θ2) > η(θ1).






is nonnegative and equals 0 only if µθ = ν, we have η(θ) > 0 for θ > 0. Let µ∗ denote





)dµ∗. Since problem (2.2.2) is a relaxation
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of problem (2.4.1)–(2.4.2), we conclude that for all θ > 0,
∫
Rd×Rd
< x, y > dµ∗(x, y) ≥
∫
Rd×Rd
< x, y > dµθ(x, y). (A.3)







> η∗. By adding − 1
θ∗
η∗ to the
left and − 1
θ∗
η(θ∗) to the right of (A.3), the inequality does not change, which contradicts the
optimality of µθ∗ . Thus η(θ) ≤ η∗. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
We divide the proof into several parts, starting with the convergence of the objective function
value asserted in part (i) of the theorem.
A.3.1 Convergence of the Optimal Objective Value
We will first show that for any feasible solution to the limiting problem, we can construct
a sequence of approximating solutions that approach the limiting objective function from
above. To get the reverse inequality we will use a dual formulation of the limiting objective
and show that it is approached from below.
Since Y has finite support, we may assume without loss of generality that q(yj) > 0
for all j. If we had q(yj) = 0 for some j, we could reformulate an equivalent problem by
removing the marginal constraint on yj .
Let µ ∈ Π(p, q) be any feasible solution to the limiting problem. Write µ(dx, y) =
p(dx)q(y|x), and define the following mass function on the pairs (Xi, yj), i = 1, . . . , N ,
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We will not in general have q̄N = qN , so µN is not in general a feasible solution to
the finite problem, in the sense that µN 6∈ Π(pN , qN). However, by the strong law of large








q(yj|x) dp(x) = q(yj), a.s.,
because µ ∈ Π(p, q). Also by the strong law of large numbers, we have qN(yj) → q(yj),
a.s. We will therefore consider a relaxed constraint. Let Πε(pN , qN) denote the set of joint
distributions on Rd × Rd with marginals pN and q′, where |q′(yj) − qN(yj)| ≤ ε, j =
1, . . . , d+ 1.
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G(µ, νN) ≥ sup
µ∈Π(p,q)
G(µ, ν).
Proof: For each N , we are maximizing a concave function over a compact convex set,
so the maximum is indeed attained. Write cN for maxµ∈Π(pN ,qN ) G(µ, νN) and cN,ε for
maxµ∈Πε(pN ,qN ) G(µ, νN). For any µ ∈ Π(p, q), define µN as in (A.1). Then µN ∈ Πε(pN , qN)







































< Xi, yj >→
∫ d+1∑
j=1
< x, yj > q(yj|x)dp(x) =
∫



























Since this holds for any µ ∈ Π(p, q),
lim
N→∞




Recall cN = maxµ∈Π(pN ,qN ) G(µ, νN). We claim that
cN,ε ≤ cN + εKN , (A.3)
for








where K1 and K2 are constants. We prove (A.3) in Appendix A.3.3.
Under our assumption that Eν [exp(θ < X, Y >)] < ∞, the sequence KN satisfies
KN/N
α → 0, for any α ∈ (0, 1/2). Set εN = 1/Nα so εNKN → 0. By the law of the
iterated logarithm, with probability 1,
max
1≤j≤d+1
|qN(yj)− q(yj)| < εN/2 and max
1≤j≤d+1
|q̄N(yj)− q(yj)| < εN/2
for all sufficiently large N , and then
max
1≤j≤d+1
|q̄N(yj)− qN(yj)| < εN
as well. In other words, for any µ ∈ Π(p, q), we have µN ∈ ΠεN (pN , qN) for all sufficiently










cN +KNεN = lim
N→∞
cN .





We now establish the reverse inequality.





G(µ, νN) ≤ sup
µ∈Π(p,q)
G(µ, ν), a.s.


















By Theorem 3 of Rüschendorf and Thomsen [50], the optimum in (A.4) is attained at a
solution of the form
dµ∗(x, y) = ea(x)+b(y)+θ<x,y> dν(x, y), (A.5)
for some functions a and b on Rd. Similarly, for finite N , the optimizer of G(µ, νN) over
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µ ∈ Π(pN , qN) has the form
dµ∗N(x, y) = e
aN (x)+bN (y)+θ<x,y> dνN(x, y).
For the rest of the proof, we will work with the formulation in (A.4), omitting the constant
factor of 1/θ. We will apply a dual formulation of Bhattacharya [13]. To this end, consider




h2(y) dq(y) ≥ 0.
The convex cone Π∗ is contained within the dual cone of Π(p, q), which is the set of functions
h : Rd × Rd → R that have nonnegative expectations with respect to all µ ∈ Π(p, q). We






With a and b as in (A.5), set
h∗1(x) = a(x) + c/2, h
∗









h∗2(y) dq(y) = 0,
so this (h∗1, h
∗








ea(x)+b(x)+c+θ<x,y> dν(x, y) = ln
∫
ec dµ∗(x, y) = c. (A.6)
The primal objective in (A.4) evaluated at (A.5) yields
−D(µ∗|eθ<x,y>ν) = −
∫
[a(x) + b(y)] dµ∗(x, y) = c,
so the primal and dual objective values agree. It follows from Theorem 2.1 of Bhattacharya
[13] that this choice of (h∗1, h
∗
2) is optimal for the dual objective.











h2(y) dqN(y) ≥ 0.










h2(y) dq(y) ≥ ε.
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The infimum is finite because the integral is finite for any constant h1, h2. Let (hε1, h
ε
2) be







2(y)+θ<x,y> dν ≤ cε∞ + ε.
















hε2(y) dq(y) ≥ ε,




hε2(y) dqN(y) ≥ 0.
In other words, (hε1, h
ε





















h∗2(y) dq(y) = 0,
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so (h∗1 + ε/2, h
∗

















2(y)+ε+θ<x,y> dν = c,





Combining Lemmas A.3.1 and A.3.2 proves part (i) of the theorem.
A.3.2 Weak Convergence of Optimal Solutions
Define






We will show that, almost surely, ΠN is compact (with respect to the topology of weak
convergence on Rd × Rd) for all sufficiently large N . It will follow that any sequence of
optimizers {µ∗n} is then eventually contained within a compact set, so every subsequence
has a convergent subsequence.
Lemma A.3.3. ΠN is compact for all sufficiently large N , a.s.
Proof: By Prohorov’s Theorem (Billingsley [14], p.37) the set ΠN is compact if it is uni-
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formly tight, meaning that for all ε > 0 we can find a compact subset A of Rd×Rd such that
µ(A) ≥ 1− ε, for all µ ∈ ΠN . Let A1, A2 be compact subsets of Rd such that
P (X ∈ A1) =
∫
A1
dp(x) ≥ 1− ε/4, P (Y ∈ A2) =
∫
A2
dq(x) ≥ 1− ε/4.




dµ(x, y) ≤ P (X 6∈ A1) + P (Y 6∈ A2) ≤ ε/2.
With probability 1, for all sufficiently large N and µ ∈ Π(pN , qN),
∫






1{Xi 6∈A1} + 1{Yi 6∈A2}
)
≤ ε.
Thus, with probability 1, ΠN is uniformly tight for all sufficiently largeN , and thus compact.

The optimizers µ∗N are contained in the sets Π(pN , qN), so for all sufficiently large N ,
the sequence µ∗n, n ≥ N , is contained in a compact set ΠN , and then every subsequence has
a further subsequence that converges weakly.
Suppose the subsequence µ∗nk converges, say µ
∗
nk
⇒ µ̃. The marginals of µ∗nk converge
to p and q, so µ̃ ∈ Π(p, q), making µ̃ feasible for the limiting problem. We claim that it is










by the strong law of large numbers, because the condition Eν [eθ<x,y>] <∞ implies that the
limit is finite. This is then more than sufficient to ensure that
∫
< x, y > dµ∗nk(x, y)→
∫
< x, y > dµ̃(x, y). (A.9)
Moreover, relative entropy is lower semi-continuous with respect to weak convergence (Dupuis





G(µ̃, ν) ≥ lim
k→∞
G(µ∗nk , νnk) = sup
µ∈Π(p,q)
G(µ, ν),
by part (i) of the theorem. Thus, µ̃ is optimal. Using the equivalence between the optimiza-
tion of G(·, ν) and (A.4), we know from Theorem 3 of Rüschendorf and Thomsen [50] that
the maximum is uniquely attained by some µ∗, and thus µ̃ = µ∗.
We have shown that every subsequence of µ∗n has a further subsequence that converges to
µ∗. It follows that µ∗n ⇒ µ∗. This proves part (ii) of the theorem. The uniform integrability
needed for (2.4.7) follows as in (A.9), which proves part (iii).
A.3.3 Proof of Inequality (A.3)
It remains to prove (A.3). First we construct a feasible solution µ̂N of maxµ∈Π(pN ,qN ) G(µ, νN)
by modifying the optimal solution µ∗N,ε of the relaxed problem maxµ∈Πε(pN ,qN ) G(µ, νN).
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Then we use the difference between G(µ̂N , νN) and G(µ∗N,ε, νN) to bound the difference





N,ε)ij − qN(yj), which is the difference between the Y marginal of
µ∗N,ε and the empirical distribution of Y . Note that |εNj | ≤ ε for j = 1, ..., d + 1. We claim





ij, i = 1, ..., N and j = 1, ..., d+ 1,
satisfies the following conditions:
µ̂N ∈ Π(pN , qN), (A.10)∑N
i=1
∑d+1
j=1 |ε∗ij| ≤ (d+ 1)ε, (A.11)
−CN · ε · 1N ≤ ε
∗
ij ≤ CN · ε · (µ∗N,ε)ij, (A.12)
where CN = maxj=1,··· ,d+1{1/qN(yj)}. Since q(yj) > 0 for j = 1, · · · , d + 1, we know
qN(yj) > 0 for all j and N large enough, and CN is well defined.
To see that such {ε∗ij} exist, rearrange {εNj } in descending order {εNjk} for k = 1, · · · , d+
1, and let m denote number of nonnegative elements. Note that εNjk ≥ 0 for k = 1, · · · ,m,

































for i = 1, · · · , N and k = m+ 1, · · · , d+ 1.






































































|. Thus {ε∗ij} satisfy
(A.11).
For k = 1, · · · ,m,












For k = m+ 1, · · · , d+ 1,




≥ −CN · ε ·
1
N
Thus {ε∗ij} satisfy (A.12).
Because µ̂N is feasible but not necessarily optimal, we have
G(µ̂N , νN) ≤ cN ≤ cN,ε.
We will show that
cN,ε −G(µ̂N , νN) ≤ εKN , (A.13)
for








where K2 is a constant. It then follows that
cN,ε − cN ≤ εKN .
To show (A.13), write
cN,ε −G(µ̂N , νN) =
( ∫
< x, y > dµN,ε −
∫


















The first part has upper bound




| < Xi, yj > | · ε.
Let x = dµN,ε/dνN and x−∆x = dµ̂N/dνN . Drop the factor −1/θ and rewrite the second
part as follows:
∫
x lnx− (x−∆x) ln(x−∆x) dνN
=
∫






















































(1− CN · ε)
) dνN − C2Nε− C3N(d+ 1)ε2
≥ − CN
(1− CN · ε)
· ε− C2Nε− C3N(d+ 1)ε2
= −
( CN
(1− CN · ε)





:= −KCN ,ε · ε
We explain the inequalities in turn. The first inequality follows from lnx ≤ x− 1 for x ≥ 0,
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and the second inequality follows from both lnx ≤ x − 1 for x ≥ 0 and x lnx ≥ x − 1 for
x ≥ 0. The third inequality follows by dropping a positive term ∆x in the first integral and
noting that
∫





















−C2N · ε · (µN,ε)ij = −C2N · ε, by (A.12),
and
∫
1{∆x<0}(−∆x)2 dνN ≥ −
∫




















The fourth inequality holds because ∆x ≤ x · CN · ε for ∆x ≥ 0, by (A.12).
The coefficient KCN ,ε is increasing in both CN and ε. Since qN(yj)→ q(yj) as N →∞,
CN → maxj=1,··· ,d+1{1/q(yj)} as N → ∞, thus we can find a constant C ≥ CN for all N .
On the other hand, without loss of generality we can assume that ε is small enough, such that
1− C · ε > 1/2, i.e. ε < 1/(2C). Choose K2 = KC,1/(2C). Then
∫
x lnx− (x−∆x) ln(x−∆x) dνN ≥ −K2 · ε
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for all N and ε small enough. We thus have








= KN · ε,
and ((A.13)) is proved. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.6.1
Let µ ∈ Π̄(p, q) be any feasible solution to the limiting problem. Write µ((dx, dz), y) =
p(dx, dz)q(y|x, z), and define the mass function µN on ((Xi, Zi), yj), i = 1, . . . , N , j =
1, . . . , d+ 1, by setting




















< Zi, yj > µN((Xi, Zi), yj).
116
By the strong law of large numbers for the i.i.d. sequence (Xi, Zi), i = 1, . . . , N , we have








< Zi, yj > q(yj|(Xi, Zi)) →
∫ d+1∑
j=1
< hZ(x, z), yj > q(yj|(x, z)) dp(x, z)
=
∫
< hZ(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y) = v0,
where v0 is the value in the constraint (2.6.1) because µ ∈ Π̄(p, q). In fact, by the law of the
iterated logarithm, if we set εN = 1/Nα with 0 < α < 1/2, then, with probability 1,
max
1≤j≤d+1
|q̄N(yj)− q(yj)| < εN , max
1≤j≤d+1
|q̄N(yj)− qN(yj)| < εN
and, under our square-integrability condition on Z,
|v̄N0 − v0| < εN ,
for all sufficiently large N . It follows that µN ∈ Π̄εN (pN , qN), for all sufficiently large N .
A.4.1 Upper Bound
Because µN is feasible for all sufficiently large N , it provides a lower bound on the optimal













q(yj|(Xi, Zi)) < Xi, yj > .
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< hX(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y)
And since this holds for any µ ∈ Π̄(p, q),
lim
N→∞
cN,εN ≥ c∞. (A.1)
A.4.2 Lower Bound
To prove a lower bound, we formulate a dual problem for the relaxed finite-N problem
(2.6.4) with objective value dN,ε, and we formulate a dual for the limiting problem (2.6.3)
with objective value d∞.
The relaxed finite problem in (2.6.4) is a linear program. Its dual can be written as
dN,ε ≡ min
Φ,Ψ1,Ψ2,ξ1,ξ2
{FN(Φ,Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2) + εK(Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2)} (A.2)
with








(Ψ1j + Ψ2j) · qN(yj) + (ξ1 + ξ2)v0
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and
K(Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2) =
d+1∑
j=1
(Ψ1j −Ψ2j) + (ξ1 − ξ2),
the infimum taken over Φ ∈ R, Ψ1j ≥ 0, Ψ2j ≤ 0, ξ1 ≥ 0, ξ2 ≤ 0, satisfying
Φi + Ψ1j + Ψ2j + (ξ1 + ξ2)· < Zi, yj > ≥ < Xi, yj >,
for i = 1, ..., N , and all j = 1, ..., d+ 1 with qN(yj) > 0. We have already seen that problem
(2.6.4) is feasible for all sufficiently large N , and once it is feasible cN,ε = dN,ε by standard
linear programming duality.
We define the dual of the limiting problem (2.6.3) by setting
d∞ = inf
φ,ψ,ξ
F (φ, ψ, ξ)
with
F (φ, ψ, ξ) =
∫




the infimum taken over functions φ : Rd × Rd → R, ψ : Rd → R, and a scalar ξ ∈ R,
satisfying, for all (x, z) in the support of p and all y in the support of q,
φ(x, z) + ψ(y) + ξ < z, y > ≥ < x, y >,
with φ ∈ L1(p).
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For any ε̃ > 0, we may pick φε̃, ψε̃, and ξε̃ feasible for the limiting dual and for which
F (φε̃, ψε̃, ξε̃) ≤ d∞ + ε̃.
We may then define a feasible solution to (A.2) by setting Φi = φε̃(Xi, Zi), Ψ1j = ψ+ε̃ (yj),
Ψ2j = −ψ−ε̃ (yj), ξ1 = ξ+ε̃ , and ξ2 = −ξ−ε̃ . By the strong law of large numbers, this choice
yields
FN(Φ,Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2)→ F (φε̃, ψε̃, ξε̃), a.s.
For any ε̄ > 0, there is a stochastic N(ε̃, ε̄) such that for all N > N(ε̃, ε̄),
FN(Φ,Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2) ≤ F (φε̃, ψε̃, ξε̃) + ε̄, a.s.,
and this N(ε̃, ε̄) does not depend on the ε that defines the relaxation (A.2). Thus, we have,
for all sufficiently large N ,
dN,ε ≤ d∞ + ε̃+ ε̄+K(Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2)ε;
and, because N(ε̃, ε̄) does not depend on ε,
dN,εN ≤ d∞ + ε̃+ ε̄+K(Ψ1,Ψ2, ξ1, ξ2)εN ,
for all N > N(ε̃, ε̄), so
lim
N→∞
dN,εN ≤ d∞ + ε̃+ ε̄.
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We have already noted that dN,εN = cN,εN by ordinary linear programming duality. In
Appendix A.4.3 we show that that






dN,εN ≤ d∞ = c∞,
which, together with (A.1) proves the result.
A.4.3 A Duality Result
In this section, we prove the equality c∞ = d∞ used in Appendix A.4.2. The result follows
from Theorem 5.10 of Villani [54], once we show that we can transform the primal problem
to an equivalent problem that satisfies the conditions of the theorem. We formulate the
equivalent problem using a result of Luenberger [42], for which we adopt his notation.




Let Ω ⊂ X be the subset of probability measures with marginals p and q, which is a convex
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− < hX(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y).
Let G(·) be a mapping from X to R defined by
G(µ) =
∫
< hZ(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y)− v0.
The primal problem is







− < hX(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y) + ξ ·G(µ)
}
. (A.4)
Now apply Theorem 1 of Section 8.6 of Luenberger [42] (with the extension in problem 7 of






and there exists ξ∗ such that L(ξ∗) = −c∞.
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− < hX(x, z), y > dµ((x, z), y) + ξ∗ ·
∫




− < hX(x, z), y > +ξ∗· < hZ(x, z), y >
)
dµ((x, z), y)










where c((x, z), y) =< hX(x, z), y >, and v((x, z), y) =< hZ(x, z), y >.
Let a(x, z) = 1
2
< (x, ξ∗z), (x, ξ∗z) > and b(y) = 1
2
< y, y >. We have
− < hX(x, z), y > +ξ∗· < hZ(x, z), y > ≥ − a(x, z)− b(y).
By condition (i) in Theorem 2.6.1, a ∈ L1(p) and b ∈ L1(q). It follows from Theorem 5.10
of Villani [54] that strong duality holds, i.e. L∗ = DL∗.
Since L∗ < +∞ and − < hX(x, z), y > +ξ∗· < hZ(x, z), y > ≤ a(x, z) + b(y), it
follows from part (iii) of Theorem 5.10 of Villani [54] that solutions exists for both problems.










Let d∗ denote the objective value by substituting (φ∗, ψ∗, ξ∗) in the objective function. Note
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that d∗ = −DL∗+ ξ∗v0 = −L∗+ ξ∗v0 = c∞, so (φ∗, ψ∗, ξ∗) is optimal for the dual problem
d∞, and strong duality holds d∞ = c∞. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2.6.2
We show the convergence result for the penalty problems with the auxiliary constraints in
(2.6.1) as N →∞. We start with the convergence of the objective function value asserted in
part (i) of the theorem.
A.5.1 Convergence of the Optimal Objective Value
Let G∞ denote the optimal value of the penalty limit problem,
G∞ = sup
µ∈Π̄(p,q)
G(µ, ν) = sup
µ∈Π̄(p,q)
∫







Let GN,ε be the optimal value of the penalty finite relaxed problem with sample size N ,
GN,ε = sup
µ∈Π̄ε(pN ,qN )
G(µ, νN) = sup
µ∈Π̄ε(pN ,qN )
∫







Lemma A.5.1. limN→∞GN,εN ≥ G∞, for εN = 1/Nα and α ∈ (0, 1/2).
Proof: Let µ ∈ Π̄(p, q) be any feasible solution to the limiting problem. Define a mass
function on the pairs ((Xi, Zi), yj), i = 1, · · · , N , j = 1, · · · , d+ 1:












































the limit following from the strong law of large numbers. Thus, limN→∞GN,εN ≥ G∞. 
We have shown that the limiting objective value is a lower bound for the sequence in part
(i) of Theorem 2.6.2. We will use a dual formulation to show the reverse inequality. The
argument requires several lemmas.







exp(θ < x, y >)dν((x, z), y)
)










Define Π̄∗(p, q) to be the set of functions h : (Rd × Rd)× Rd → R of the form
h((x, z), y) = h1(x, z) + h2(y) + h3v((x, z), y)− h4
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where
v((x, z), y) =< hZ(x, z), y >=< z, y >,
with ∫
h((x, z), y)dµ((x, z), y) ≥ 0, for all µ ∈ Π̄(p, q).





eh((x,z),y)+θ<x,y> dν((x, z), y), (A.5)
The following statements hold:
(i) The optimal solution to the primal problem is
dµ∗((x, z), y) = ea(x,z)+b(y)+ξv((x,z),y)+θ<x,y> dν((x, z), y). (A.6)
(ii) The optimal solution to the dual problem is




3v((x, z), y)− h∗4,
h∗1(x, z) = a(x, z), h
∗





a(x, z) + b(y) + ξ · v((x, z), y) dµ∗((x, z), y).
(iii) Strong duality holds, P∞ = −D∞.
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Proof: Conclusion (i) follows Theorem 3 of Rüschendorf and Thomsen [50].
To apply the dual formulation in Bhattacharya, we consider the set Π̄∗(p, q) of functions
h : (Rd × Rd)× Rd → R of the form
h((x, z), y) = h1(x, z) + h2(y) + h3v((x, z), y)− h4
with, for any µ ∈ Π̄(p, q)
∫
h((x, z), y)dµ((x, z), y) =
∫
h1(x, z) dp((x, z)) +
∫
h2(y) dq(y) + h3v0 − h4
≥ 0.
Observe that (the convex cone) Π̄∗(p, q) is contained within the dual cone of Π̄(p, q). We





eh((x,z),y)+θ<x,y> dν((x, z), y).
With µ∗, a(x, z), b(x), ξ as in (A.6), set
h∗1(x, z) = a(x, z), h
∗
2(x) = b(x), h
∗
3 = ξ,
h∗4 = c ≡
∫




h∗((x, z), y)dµ((x, z), y) =
∫
h∗1((x, z)) dp((x, z)) +
∫
h∗2(y) dq(y) + h
∗
3v0 − h∗4 = 0,





4, the dual objective function value in (A.5) is
D∞ = ln
∫
ea(x,z)+b(y)+ξv((x,z),y)−c+θ<x,y> dν((x, z), y) = ln
∫
e−c dµ∗(x, y) = −c.




a(x, z) + b(y) + ξv((x, z), y) dµ∗((x, z), y) = c.







for the dual problem (A.5), and strong duality holds P∞ = −D∞. 
Next we establish a similar result for the discrete problem. Define Π̄∗εN (pN , qN) to be set
of functions h : (Rd × Rd)× Rd → R of the form
h((x, z), y) = h1(x, z) + h2(y) + h3v((x, z), y)− h4
with ∫
h((x, z), y)dµN((x, z), y) ≥ 0,
for all µN ∈ Π̄εN (pN , qN).
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Lemma A.5.3. For the primal problem
PN,εN = min
µ∈Π̄εN (pN ,qN )
∫ (
dµ((x, z), y)
exp(θ < x, y >)dνN((x, z), y)
)
dµ((x, z), y), (A.7)
define the dual
DN,εN = inf
h∈Π̄∗εN (pN ,qN )
ln
∫
eh((x,z),y)+θ<x,y> dνN((x, z), y). (A.8)
The following statements hold:
(i) The optimal solution to the primal problem takes the form







2 v((x,z),y)+θ<x,y> dνN((x, z), y),
where bN1 (y) ≤ 0, bN2 (y) ≥ 0, ξN1 ≤ 0, ξN2 ≥ 0.
(ii) A feasible solution to the dual is h̃,
h̃((x, z), y) = h̃1(x, z) + h̃2(y) + h̃3v((x, z), y)− h̃4, where
h̃1(x, z) = a(x, z), h̃2(x) = b1(x) + b2(x), h̃3 = ξ1 + ξ2,
h̃4 =
∫
a(x, z) dpN(x, z) +
∫




(b1(yj)− b2(yj))εN + (ξ1 − ξ2)εN
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where b1(y) = b(y)−, b2(y) = b(y)+, and ξ1 = ξ−, ξ2 = ξ+, for a(x, z), b(x), ξ as in (A.6).
(iii) D∞ ≥ lim
N→∞
DN,εN .
Proof: Conclusion (i) is the discrete form of part (i) in Lemma A.5.2. For (ii), we consider
the dual problem
inf
h∈Π̄∗εN (pN ,qN )
ln
∫
eh((x,z),y)+θ<x,y> dνN((x, z), y).
Let h̃1(x, z) = a(x, z), h̃2(x) = b1(x) + b2(x), h̃3 = ξ1 + ξ2 and
h̃4 = c̃ ≡
∫
a(x, z) dpN(x, z) +
∫




(b1(yj)− b2(yj))εN + (ξ1 − ξ2)εN




(b1(yj)− b2(yj))εN + (ξ1 − ξ2)εN ≤ 0.
130
For any µN ∈ Π̄εN (pN , qN),
∫
h̃(x, y)dµN((x, z), y) =
∫
h̃1(x, z) dpN(x, z)
+
∫ (
h̃2(y) + h̃3v((x, z), y)
)
dµN((x, z), y)− h̃4
≥
∫
h̃1(x, z) dpN(x, z) +
∫




(b1(yj)− b2(yj))εN + (ξ1 − ξ2)εN
=
∫
a(x, z) dpN(x, z) +
∫




(b1(yj)− b2(yj))εN + (ξ1 − ξ2)εN − h̃4
= 0
so this (h̃1, h̃2, h̃3, h̃4) is feasible for the dual problem (A.8).




















b(y) dqN(y)− ξv0 −
d+1∑
j=1

























































a(x, z) dp(x, z)−
∫




so D∞ ≥ lim
N→∞
DN,εN . 
Lemma A.5.4. G∞ ≥ lim supN GN,εN .
Proof: From strong duality of the continuous problem (A.4) and (A.5) in Lemma A.5.2, we
have G∞ = −1θP∞ =
1
θ
D∞. By weak duality of the finite relaxed problem (A.7) and (A.8),
we have 1
θ













Combining Lemma A.5.1 and Lemma A.5.4 proves part (i) of Theorem 2.6.2.
A.5.2 Weak Convergence of Optimal Solutions
The argument is similar to that of Section A.3.2. Define







By the argument used in Lemma A.3.3, we have
Lemma A.5.5. Π̄N is compact for all sufficiently large N, a.s.
The optimizers µ̄∗N are contained in the sets Π̄εN (pN , qN), so for all sufficiently large N ,
the sequence µ̄∗n, n ≥ N , is contained in a compact set Π̄N , and then every subsequence has
a further subsequence that converges weakly.
Suppose the subsequence µ̄∗nk converges, say µ̄
∗
nk
⇒ µ̃. The marginals of µ̄∗nk converge
to p and q, and limk→∞
∫
v((x, z), y) dµ̄∗nk = v0, so µ̃ ∈ Π̄(p, q), making µ̃ feasible for the









by the strong law of large numbers, because the condition Eν [eθ<hx(x,z),y>] <∞ implies that
the limit is finite. This is then more than sufficient to ensure that
∫





< hx(x, z), y > dµ̃((x, z), y). (A.9)
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Moreover, relative entropy is lower semi-continuous with respect to weak convergence (Dupuis





G(µ̃, ν) ≥ lim
k→∞
G(µ̄∗nk , νnk) = sup
µ∈Π̄(p,q)
G(µ, ν),
by part (i) of the theorem. Thus, µ̃ is optimal. Using the equivalence between the optimiza-
tion of G(·, ν) and (A.4), we know from Theorem 2.1 of Csiszár [26] that the maximum is
uniquely attained by some µ̄∗, and thus µ̃ = µ̄∗.
We have shown that every subsequence of µ̄∗n has a further subsequence that converges to
µ̄∗. It follows that µ̄∗n ⇒ µ̄∗. This proves part (ii) of the theorem. The uniform integrability
needed for (2.6.5) follows as in (A.9), which proves part (iii). 
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Appendix B
Additional Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
We prove the Proposition for the case of V (x, p); the case of V̄ (x) is similar. For each given













, s ≥ t,
and
dZs := µ̃sZsds+ σ̃sZsdWs, s ≥ t, Zt = 1.
135
Then, for s ∈ (ζi, τi], we have
Xs− = xK
i−1Zs, s ∈ (ζi, τi], Xs− = xKi−1(1− ks)Zs, s ∈ (τi, ζi+1], i ≥ 1,
Ps− = p, s ∈ [t, ζ2], Ps− = Xζi =
Xζi−
1 + kp
= xKi−1Zζi , s ∈ (ζi, ζi+1], i ≥ 2.





We prove it only for the case of ρ > 0; the case of ρ = 0 is similar.
We first show that there exists α̃ ∈ [ᾱ, 1] such that ū(x) ≤ C(1 + xα̃), ∀x > 0 for some






. This is true when ᾱ < 1 because ᾱ = limx→+∞
xū′(x)
ū(x)













. In addition, in the case that γ+ = 0 we have ū(x) = u(x) ≤ C(1+x),∀x >
0 for some C > 0 because of the concavity of u(x) in x > 1, and in the case that γ+ > 0, we
also have ū(x) ≤ C(1 + x), ∀x > 0 for some C > 0.
Observe that U(Gt, Rt) = P
β







. Therefore, for any
stopping times t ≤ τ1 ≤ ζ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ · · · , each i ≥ 2, and each T ≥ t, we have

















































































































































:= exp[ρ1(T − t)].
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:= exp[ρ2(T − t)].
Because δ + ρ > max{βr, βµ − β(1−β)
2
σ2, α̃µ − α̃(1−α̃)
2
σ2} and ρ > 0, we conclude that




















Similarly, one can show that
Et[e−δ(τ1−t)U(Gτ1−, Rτ1−)1{τ1<τ̃}]
≤ Et[e−δ(τ1−t)CP βτ1−(1 + (Xτ1−/Pτ1−)
α̃)1{τ1<τ̃}]
= Et[e−δ(τ1−t)Cpβ(1 + (x/p)α̃Zατ1)1{τ1<τ̃}]
= CpβEt[e−δ(τ1−t)1{τ1<τ̃}] + Cpβ(x/p)α̃Et[e−δ(τ1−t)Z α̃τ11{τ1<τ̃}]
≤ Cpβ(1 + (x/p)α̃ ρ
ρ− ρ3
),
























+ Cpβ(1 + (x/p)α̃ · ρ
ρ− ρ3
).



















) + Cpβ(1 + (x/p)α̃ · ρ
ρ− ρ3
).
Therefore, we conclude that



















Part two: We prove V (x, p) = +∞ for any x > 0 and p > 0 under certain conditions.
We first consider the case in which ρ > 0 and θ > 0. If δ + ρ < βr, we consider the
strategy of holding the risk-free asset until the shock time. The terminal wealth utility for
this strategy is






If δ + ρ < βµ − β(1−β)
2
σ2, we consider the strategy of holding the stock until the shock
























If δ + ρ < ᾱµ − ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2, we consider the strategy of holding the stock until the shock
time and compute the realization utility experienced by the agent at the shock time. Because
δ + ρ < ᾱµ − ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2




ū(x) ≥ ū(0) = −λ(1 − γ−)β for x ≥ 0 and ᾱ = limx→+∞ xū
′(x)
ū(x)
, there exists C1 > 0
and C2 > 0, such that ū(x) ≥ C1(xα̂ − C2), ∀x ≥ 0. Consequently, the realization utility
experienced by the agent at the shock time is
Et[e−δ(τ̃−t)U(Gτ̃−, Rτ̃−)] = Et[e−δ(τ̃−t)P βτ̃−ū(Xτ̃−/Pτ̃−)]



















Next, we consider the case in which ρ = 0. If δ < βµ − β(1−β)
2
σ2, consider the fol-
lowing strategy: τ1 = inf{s ≥ t|Zs/Zt ≥ Λ}, ζi = τi−1, τi = inf{s ≥ ζi|Zs/Zζi ≥ Λ},









(µ− (1/2)σ2)2 + 2δσ2
]
. Furthermore, we have Et[e−δ(τi−t)] =































Because δ < βµ− β(1−β)
2
σ2, we conclude that β + κ > 0. Then, we can choose Λ > 1 such
that KβΛβ+κ > 1. Consequently,
∑+∞
i=2 (K
βΛβ+κ)i−1 = +∞, i.e., the agent experiences
infinite realization utility.
If δ < ᾱµ − ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2, consider the following strategy: τ1 = inf{s ≥ t|Zs/Zt ≥ Λ},






Recall that we can find α̂ < ᾱ such that δ < α̂µ− α̂(1−α̂)
2
σ2 and ū(x) ≥ C1(xα̂−C2),∀x ≥ 0





≥ C1pβ(x/p)α̂Λα̂+κ − C1C2pβg(Λ)
≥ C1pβ(x/p)α̂Λα̂+κ − C1C2pβ.
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Because δ < α̂µ − α̂(1−α̂)
2
σ2, we can show that α̂ + κ > 0. Consequently, the realization
utility of the agent goes to infinity as Λ→ +∞.
If δ < βr, consider the following strategy: τ1 = t, ζ2 = n+ t, τ2 = inf{s ≥ ζ2|Zs/Zζ2 ≥












which goes to infinity as n→ +∞.
Finally, we consider the case in which ρ > 0 and θ = 0. Using the same argument in the
case of ρ > 0 and θ > 0, we can show that V (x, p) = +∞ if δ + ρ < ᾱµ− ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Denote ξ = (τ1, ζ2, τ2, · · · ) and J(x, p, ξ) as the sequence of stopping times and the objective
function, respectively, in problem (3.2.5). Similarly, denote ξ̄ = (ζ1, τ1, ζ2, τ2, · · · ) and
J̄(x, ξ̄) as the sequence of stopping times and the objective function, respectively, in problem
(3.2.6).
By careful investigation, one can see that J̄(x, ξ̄) = xβJ̄(1, ξ̄). Therefore, V̄ (x) is homo-
geneous in x of degree β. Next, we prove (3.3.1), i.e., prove V (x, p) = supτ≥t Et[F (x, p, τ)],
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where
F (x, p, τ) :=e−δ(τ−t)
[
U(Gτ−, Rτ−) + V̄ ((1− ks)Xτ−)
]
1{τ<τ̃}
+ e−δ(τ̃−t) [U(Gτ̃−, Rτ̃−) + UW ((1− ks)Xτ̃ )]1{τ̃≤τ}.
On the one hand, applying the tower property of expectation operators, we conclude
J(x, p, ξ) =Et
[
e−δ(τ1−t)Eτ1 [H]1{τ1<τ̃} + e−δ(τ1−t)U(Gτ1−, Rτ1−)1{τ1<τ̃}
+ e−δ(τ̃−t)
(




















Note that Xτ1 = (1 − ks)Xτ1− on {τ1 < τ̃}. In addition, {Wτ1+s}s≥0 is a standard Brow-
nian motion, so there exist {Fs}-stopping times t ≤ ζ̄1 ≤ τ̄1 ≤ ζ̄2 ≤ . . . such that
({Wτ1+s}s≥0, ζ2−τ1, τ2−τ1, ζ3−τ1, . . . ) is identically distributed as ({Wt+s}s≥0, ζ̄1−t, τ̄1−
t, ζ̄2 − t, . . . ). Therefore, denoting ξ̄ = (ζ̄1, τ̄1, ζ̄1, . . . ), we conclude, for each realization of
Xτ1−, that
Eτ1 [H]1{τ1<τ̃} = J̄((1− ks)Xτ1−, ξ̄)1{τ1<τ̃} ≤ V̄ ((1− ks)Xτ1−)1{τ1<τ̃}.
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Consequently,
J(x, p, ξ) ≤Et
[
e−δ(τ1−t)V̄ ((1− ks)Xτ1−)1{τ1<τ̃} + e−δ(τ1−t)U(Gτ1−, Rτ1−)1{τ1<τ̃}
+ e−δ(τ̃−t)
(




for any τ1 ≥ t, so we conclude V (x, p) ≤ supτ≥t Et[F (x, p, τ)].
On the other hand, for any ε > 0, there exist τ1 ≥ t such that
sup
τ≥t
Et[F (x, p, τ)]− ε ≤Et
[
F (x, p, τ1)
]
.
In addition, there exist ξ̄ = (ζ̄1, τ̄1, ζ̄1, . . . ) such that V (1)− ε ≤ J̄(1, ξ̄). Consequently,
F (x, p, τ1) =e
−δ(τ1−t)
[
U(Gτ−, Rτ−) + ((1− ks)Xτ1−)βV̄ (1)
]
1{τ1<τ̃}
+ e−δ(τ̃−t) [U(Gτ̃−, Rτ̃−) + UW ((1− ks)Xτ̃ )]1{τ̃≤τ1}
≤e−δ(τ1−t)
[
U(Gτ−, Rτ−) + ((1− ks)Xτ1−)βJ̄(1, ξ̄)
]
1{τ1<τ̃}
+ e−δ(τ̃−t) [U(Gτ̃−, Rτ̃−) + UW ((1− ks)Xτ̃ )]1{τ̃≤τ1}
+ ε(1− ks)pe−δ(τ1−t)Xβτ1−1{τ1<τ̃}.
Note that we can find {Fs}-stopping times (ζ2, τ2, ζ3, . . . ) such that ({Wτ1+s}s≥0, ζ2 −
τ1, τ2 − τ1, ζ3 − τ1, . . . ) is identically distributed as ({Wt+s}s≥0, ζ̄1 − t, τ̄1 − t, ζ̄1 − t, . . . ).
Denote ξ = (τ1, ζ2, τ2, · · · ), then straightforward calculation yields
Et
[
























+ (1 + C(1− ks)p)ε ≤ V (x, p) + (1 + C(1− ks)p)ε.
Because ε is arbitrary, we conclude that V (x, p) ≥ supτ≥t Et[F (x, p, τ)] and thus (3.3.1)
holds.
Similarly, we can verify that J(ax, ap, ξ) = aβJ(x, p, ξ) for any a > 0, so V (x, p) is
homogeneous of degree β. Using the same argument as in the proof of (3.3.1), we can prove
(3.3.2).
Next, we show that V (x, 1) is continuous in x ≥ 0. Recall {Zs}s≥t as defined in the
proof of Proposition 3.3.1. Then,
F (x, 1, τ) =e−δ(τ−t)
[















ū(xZτ̃−) + θ(1− ks)βxβZβτ̃
]
1{τ̃≤τ}.
Because ū(x) is continuous and increasing in x ≥ 0, F (x, 1, τ) is continuous and increasing
in x ≥ 0 for each τ ≥ t. Consequently, V (x, 1) = supτ≥t Et[F (x, 1, τ)] is increasing in
x ≥ 0. Moreover, the monotone convergence theorem shows that V (x, 1) is continuous in
x ≥ 0.
Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, there exist α̃ ∈ [ᾱ, 1] and C > 0 such that
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|ū(x)| ≤ C(1 + xα̃). Consequently.
|F (x, 1, τ)| ≤e−δ(τ−t)
[












Following the same proof of Proposition 3.3.1, we can show that supτ≥t Et[e−δ(τ−t)Z α̃τ 1{τ<τ̃}],
supτ≥t Et[e−δ(τ̃−t)Z α̃τ̃ 1{τ̃≤τ}], supτ≥t Et[e−δ(τ−t)Zβτ 1{τ<τ̃}], and supτ≥t Et[e−δ(τ̃−t)Z
β
τ̃ 1{τ̃≤τ}]
are finite. Because α̃ ≥ ᾱ ≥ β, we conclude that V (x, 1) ≤ C ′(1 + xα̃) for some C ′ > 0.

B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
Recall that V (x, p) is homogeneous of degree β. Denote v(1) = V (1, 1) and recall Θ. For
















)βXβζ v(1) · 1{ζ<τ̃} + e


















































The second term in the integral is
Et
[

























































Furthermore, when Kβv(1) > Θ, the inequality becomes equality if and only if ζ = t with
probability 1; i.e., ζ = t is the unique optimal purchase time in this case. Similarly, when
Kβv(1) < Θ, ζ = +∞ is the unique optimal purchase time. Finally, when Kβv(1) = Θ,
any stopping time ζ ≥ t is optimal. 
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3.4
Denote g(x) as the objective value in (3.3.4) with τ = t (which stands for the immediate




. On the other hand,
denote h(x) as the objective value in (3.3.4) with τ = +∞ (which stands for the strategy of
holding the stock until the shock time). Then, we have
h(x) = Et[e−δ(τ̃−t)(ū(Xτ̃ ) + UW ((1− ks)Xτ̃−))].
It is straightforward to see that both g and h are continuous in x ≥ 0. Furthermore, we have




showing that h(0) > g(0). By the continuity of g and h, there exist ε > 0 such that h(x) >
g(x),∀x ≤ ε. Because v(x) ≥ h(x), we conclude v(x) > g(x),∀x ≤ ε. Thus, in the
liquidation problem (3.3.4), it is optimal to hold the stock when Xt ≤ ε.
Finally, we compute v(x) when x approaches zero. According to the general theory of
optimal stopping, the optimal stopping time to problem (3.3.4) is τ ∗ = inf{s ≥ t|g(Xs) =
v(Xs)}. Denote τε as the first hitting time of {Xs} to ε. Because v(x) > g(x),∀x ≤ ε, we
conclude that τ ∗ ≥ τε. Then,
lim
x↓0
P(τ ∗ < τ̃ |Xt = x, τ̃ > t) ≤ lim
x↓0
P(τε < τ̃ |Xt = x, τ̃ > t) = 0.
Consequently, straightforward calculation shows that limx↓0 v(x) = h(0) = ρδ+ρ ū(0). 
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B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1





















subject to dXs = µXs ds+ σXs dWs, s ≥ t, Xt− = x.
(B.1)
Denote the optimal value as v(x; a). Then, problem (3.3.4) is a special case of problem
(B.1) with a = v(1), and the value function of problem (3.3.4) v(x) = v(x; v(1)). Using
the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.2, we can show that for each a ∈ R,
v(x; a) is continuous in x ≥ 0 and there exist α̃ ∈ [ᾱ, 1] and C > 0 such that |v(x; a)| ≤
C(1 + xα̃),∀x ≥ 0. In addition, α̃ can be chosen arbitrarily close to ᾱ. In particular, v(x; a)
is of linear growth in x ≥ 0.
Because the shock time τ̃ is exponentially distributed and independent of τ and {Ws},







′t · f(Xt) dt+ e−δ
′τ · g(Xτ ; a)|X0 = x
]
,
subject to dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dWt, t ≥ 0, X0 = x, x ≥ 0,
where δ′ := δ+ρ, f(x) := ρ
(
ū(x) + θ(1− ks)βxβ
)





xβ . In the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, we have shown that ū(x) is of linear growth in x ≥ 0.
Consequently, both f(x) and g(x; a) are of linear growth in x ≥ 0 for each a ∈ R. Applying
Theorem 5.2.1 in Pham [44], we conclude that for each fixed a ∈ R, v(x; a) is the unique
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viscosity solution of linear growth to following variational inequality1
min[δ′v(x)− Lv(x)− f(x), v(x)− g(x; a)] = 0, (B.2)
whereLv(x) := 1
2
σ2x2vxx(x)+µxvx(x). Recalling that the value function of problem (3.3.4)
v(x) = v(x; v(1)) and noting that equation (3.3.5) is the same as (B.2) with a = v(1), we
conclude that v is a viscosity solution of linear growth to equation (3.3.5).
Finally, we show that the solution to (3.3.5) is unique. Consider any a1 > a2 and the
viscosity solutions v(x; a1) and v(x; a2) to (B.2) with a = a1 and a = a2, respectively.
Because g(x; a1) ≥ g(x; a2) for any x ≥ 0, it immediately follows that v(x; a1) is a viscosity
super-solution to (B.2) with a = a2. By the comparison theorem in Pham [44, p. 98], we
conclude that v(x; a1) ≥ v(x; a2), ∀x ≥ 0.
Next, we define u2(x) = v1(x) − Kβ(a1 − a2)xβ and show that it is a viscosity sub-
solution to (B.2) with a = a2. Take any x0 > 0 and any test function φ2 ∈ C2(R) such that
0 = (u2− φ2)(x0) = maxx≥0(u2− φ2)(x). Define φ1(x) := φ2(x) +Kβxβ(a1− a2). Then,
max
x≥0
(v1 − φ1)(x) = max
x≥0
(u2 − φ2)(x) = (u2 − φ2)(x0) = (v1 − φ1)(x0) = 0.
Because v(x; a1) is the viscosity solution to (B.2) with a = a1, we conclude by the definition
1Theorem 5.2.1 in Pham [44] is presented in the setting in which the domain of the state process {Xt} is
the whole real line. However, all the proofs can be migrated to the setting in which the domain is the positive
real line.
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of viscosity solutions that
min
[





=δ′φ1(x0)− Lφ1(x0)− f(x0)− (a1 − a2)xβ0Kβ(δ′ −
1
2
σ2β(β − 1)− βµ)
≤(δ′φ1 − Lφ1 − f)(x0),
where the inequality is the case because of Assumption 3.3.1. On the other hand,




= v1(x0)− ū(x0)−max{Kβa1,Θ +Kβ(a1 − a2)}xβ0
≤ u2(x0)− g(x0; a1).
Therefore, we conclude from (B.3) that
min
[
δ′φ2(x0)− Lφ2(x0)− f(x0), v2(x0)− g(x0; a2)
]
≤ 0,
showing that u2 is a viscosity sub-solution to (B.2) with a = a2.
Now, by the comparison theorem in [44, p. 98], we conclude that u2(x) ≤ v2(x),∀x ∈
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R+ and, consequently,
0 ≤ v1(x)− v2(x) ≤ Kβxβ(a1 − a2). (B.4)
Denote X as the space of continuous functions on R+ with finite ‖ · ‖ norm, where
‖f‖ := supx≥0
∣∣max(x, 1)−1f(x)∣∣. Note that any continuous function on R+ has finite ‖ · ‖
norm if and only if it is of linear growth, so X is the space of continuous functions of linear
growth. In particular, for each a ∈ R, the viscosity solution to (B.2) is in X.
Define the following mapping on (X, ‖ · ‖): for each v ∈ X, define F (v) as the solution
to (B.2) with a = v(1). We conclude from (B.4) that
max(x, 1)−1|F (v1)(x)− F (v2)(x)| ≤ Kβ max(x, 1)−1xβ|v1(1)− v2(1)|
≤ Kβ|v1(1)− v2(1)| ≤ Kβ‖v1 − v2‖, ∀x > 0.
Therefore, ‖F (v1)−F (v2)‖ ≤ Kβ‖v1− v2‖, showing that F is a contract mapping on X. If
we show that X is a complete normed space, then, by the Banach fixed-point theorem, F has
a unique fixed point. Because the solution to equation (3.3.5) is equivalent to the fixed point
of F , we conclude that the solution to equation (3.3.5) is unique. Therefore, in the following,
we show that X is complete; i.e., for any Cauchy sequence {fn}n∈N in X, we show that there
exists f ∈ X such that limn→∞ ‖fn − f‖ε = 0.
For each M > 0, denote XM as the normed space of continuous functions on [0,M ]
with norm ‖ · ‖. Then, XM is a complete normed space. Define a sequence {fMn }n∈N in XM
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with fMn (x) = fn(x) for x ∈ [0,M ]. Because XM is complete, this sequence has a limit
fM ∈ XM .
Note that for ∀M1 > 0,M2 > 0, fM1(x) = fM2(x) for x ∈ [0,M1 ∧ M2]. so f :=
limM→∞ f
M is well-defined and continuous on [0,∞). Moreover, it is not difficult to see
fn(x) converges to f(x) for each x ∈ R+.
We first show that f ∈ X, i.e., ‖f‖ < ∞. Because {fn} is a Cauchy sequence in X and
|‖fn‖−‖fm‖| ≤ ‖fn−fm‖, {‖fn‖} is also a cauchy sequence, and thus {‖fn‖} is bounded,
i.e., ‖fn‖ ≤ C, ∀n ∈ N for some C > 0. Now, for any M > 0,
‖fM‖ = lim
n→+∞
‖fMn ‖ ≤ lim
n→+∞
‖fn‖ ≤ C.
Consequently, ‖f‖ = limM→+∞ ‖fM‖ ≤ C < +∞.
Next, we show that limn→∞ ‖fn − f‖ = 0. For any ε > 0, there exists N such that
‖fn − fm‖ < ε for any n > N and m > N . Consequently, for any n > N and x ∈ R+,
max(x, 1)−1|fn(x)− f(x)| = lim
m→+∞
max(x, 1)−1|fn(x)− fm(x)| ≤ ε.
Consequently, ‖fn−f‖ = supx≥0 max(x, 1)−1|fn(x)−f(x)| ≤ δ for any n > N . Therefore,
fn converges to f in X. 
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Appendix C
Algorithm to Solve Variational Inequality
(3.3.5)
In this section we propose an algorithm to solve the variational inequality (3.3.5). In view of
the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, we only need to solve (B.1) for each a ∈ R.
Following the proof of Proposition 3.3.4, we can also show that v(0; a) = ρ
δ+ρ
ū(0). On
the other hand, recall δ + ρ > ᾱµ − ᾱ(1−ᾱ)
2
σ2, so we can choose ε such that 1 + ε > ᾱ and
δ + ρ > (1 + ε)µ + ε(1+ε)
2
σ2. Moreover, because 1 + ε > ᾱ, we conclude from the proof of
Theorem 3.3.1 that limx→+∞ v(x; a)/(1 + x)1+ε = 0.
C.1 Transformation















Then, we have the following boundary conditions for v̄(y):
v̄(0) = v(0; a) =
ρ
δ + ρ





On the other hand, tedious but straightforward calculation yields the following variational
inequality for v̄:





































Next, we solve the variational inequality (C.2) with boundary conditions (C.1). We apply









In the following, we use the implicit finite difference method to solve (C.1).






v(yi+1)− 2v(yi) + v(yi−1)
∆y2
.
into the left hand side of (C.1), we obtain
A1(yi)y
2
i v̄yy(yi) + A2(yi)yiv̄yi + A3(yi)v̄(yi) + g(yi)
≈(αi − βi)v̄(yi−1)− (2αi − γi)v̄(yi) + (αi + βi)v̄(yi+1) + gi,
where αi = A1(yi)i2, βi = 12A2(yi)i, γi = A3(yi) and gi = g(yi).
Denote hi = h(yi). Denote v̄ki as the k-th iteration value of v̄(yi), i = 0, 1, . . . , Ns.
When solving for v̄k+1i , we approximate the right hand side of (C.1) by (hi − v̄k+1i )Ihi−v̄ki >0.
Consequently, we have the following equations for v̄k+1i
(αi + βi)v̄
k+1
i+1 − (2αi − γi)v̄k+1i + (αi − βi)v̄k+1i−1 + gi = −λ(hj − v̄k+1i )Ihi−v̄ki >0. (C.2)
Together with the boundary conditions v̄k+10 =
ρ
δ+ρ
ū(0) and v̄k+1Ns = 0, we can solve v̄
k+1
i ’s
efficiently. Finally, we stop once v̄k+1i and v̄
k
i are sufficiently close.
